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Most agree that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to legislate regarding 
the “badges and incidents of slavery.”  Few, however, have explored in depth the precise meaning 
of this concept.  The goal of this Article is to provide a historical and conceptual framework for 
interpreting and identifying the badges and incidents of slavery.  It examines the original public 
meaning of the terms “badge of slavery” and “incident of slavery” as well as how the “badges and 
incidents” concept has been incorporated into and used in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  
It considers several analytical variables from historical, jurisprudential, and policy perspectives, 
including what populations Congress can protect; what actors Congress can regulate; and what 
types of conduct Congress can target under its Section 2 power.   
 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the best understanding of the “badges and incidents of 
slavery” refers to public or widespread private action, aimed at any racial group or population that 
has previously been held in slavery or servitude, that mimics the law of slavery and has significant 
potential to lead to the de facto reenslavement or legal subjugation of the targeted group.  This 
limited definition will assist Congress in identifying ways in which it can fulfill the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s promise of universal civil and political freedom.  At the same time, it will provide 
judicially enforceable limits for the exercise of the Section 2 power.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1998, three white men tied James Byrd, Jr., an African 
American, to a truck and dragged him almost three miles, tearing his 
body to pieces and killing him.1  Four months later, two men tortured 
and killed Matthew Shepard, a gay man.2  In October 2009, the Mat-
thew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act be-
came law, imposing significant criminal penalties on anyone who will-
fully injures another because of that person’s “actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, or national origin . . . gender, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity or disability.”3  Although the law requires that 
any crime predicated on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
 
 1 See Stephanie Elizondo Griest, Black Leaders Honor Byrd Jr., LAREDO MORNING TIMES, June 
8, 1999, at 4A (describing a spiritual gathering in Byrd’s honor a year after his death). 
 2 See James Brooke, Gay Man Dies From Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 1998, at A1 (discussing the debate over the need for hate crimes legislation sparked 
by the killing of Matthew Shephard). 
 3 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4707, 123 
Stat. 2190, 2838–39.  Division E of the Act is denominated as the Matthew Shepard and 
James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. 
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or disability have a link to interstate commerce, no such showing is 
required where the crime is motivated by the victim’s race or color.4  
With respect to this latter class of cases, Congress made the following 
finding: 
Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after 
the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, through widespread public and private violence directed at per-
sons because of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or 
ancestry.  Accordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an im-
portant means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, inci-
dents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.5 
Through this finding, Congress invoked as its authority to pass 
this aspect of the hate crimes bill Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  While Section 1 of that amendment declares that 
“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,”6 Section 2 
gives Congress the “power to enforce” that ban “by appropriate legis-
lation.”7 
On its face, Section 2 clearly permits legislation that directly en-
forces the ban on coerced labor by “proscrib[ing], prevent[ing], or 
remed[ying]” such conduct.8  Indeed, Congress has passed a number 
of laws doing precisely that.9  Since 1883, however, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted Section 2 as “empower[ing] Congress to do 
much more” than pass direct enforcement legislation.10  Rather, Sec-
tion 2 permits Congress “to pass all laws necessary and proper for ab-
olishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”11  
Under this facet of its Section 2 power, Congress has passed several 
civil rights bills that ostensibly target the “badges and incidents of sla-
very” by prohibiting both public and private racial discrimination in 
contracts, property conveyances, and housing sales, and penalizing 
 
 4 Id.  Crimes based on the victim’s religion and national origin are covered by both the 
commerce and non-commerce sections of the law.  Id. 
 5 Id. § 4702, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–36. 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 7 Id. § 2. 
 8 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1860 dic-
tionary definitions of “enforce”). 
 9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000) (criminalizing peonage); id. § 1584 (prohibiting invo-
luntary servitude); id. §§ 1585–1588 (outlawing slave trade); id. § 1589 (penalizing forced 
labor); id. § 1590 (penalizing human trafficking); id. § 1591 (penalizing sex trafficking).  
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (imposing civil remedies for peonage). 
 10 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
 11 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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racially-motivated crimes on public property.12  The race- and color-
based provisions of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act are the most recent of these efforts, given 
Congress’s finding that both “public and private . . . racially moti-
vated violence” is one of the badges and incidents of slavery.13 
Few question that Section 2 permits Congress to legislate regard-
ing the badges and incidents of slavery,14 and this Article takes as a 
given this conception of the Section 2 power.15  What, however, quali-
fies as a badge or incident of slavery?  Does this concept refer only to 
a public law that discriminates against African Americans or, more 
generally, on the basis of race?  Alternatively, does it encompass any 
public or private practice that “perpetuates [racial] inferiority?”16  Or 
is its scope even broader, extending to “any act motivated by arbitrary 
class prejudice?”17  Surprisingly, there is no generally accepted under-
standing as to the meaning of this often-invoked but under-theorized 
concept. 
 
 12 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (establishing equal contract 
rights for citizens regardless of race); id. § 1982 (establishing equal property conveyance 
rights for citizens regardless of race); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2006) 
(prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions); 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2000) 
(addressing hate crimes committed while victim is using public facility). 
 13 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702, 123 
Stat. 2190, 2835–36 (2009). 
 14 But see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 400–01 (1985) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment 
does not justify legislation unrelated to actual slavery). 
 15 As I have argued elsewhere, the best reading of the Thirteenth Amendment’s text, histo-
ry, and structure allows for prophylactic enforcement legislation aimed at the badges and 
incidents of slavery.  See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 130 
(2010) (presenting three plausible readings of the amendment and concluding that the 
prophylactic reading is superior); see also Jones, 392 U.S. at 440 (holding that Section 2 
gives Congress “the power . . .  rationally to determine what are the badges and the inci-
dents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legisla-
tion”).  Some might question whether the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery, 
which is not grounded in constitutional text, describes the outer boundaries of Con-
gress’s Section 2 power.  My sense is that it does, and that the definition of the concept 
advanced in this piece is sufficiently broad to encompass all the conduct Congress may 
properly regulate under Section 2.  Cf. infra pp. 596–97 and 625–27 (arguing that Section 
2 does not empower Congress to regulate the relics and vestiges of slavery). 
 16 Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:  Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against 
the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 116 (1990). 
 17 G. SIDNEY BUCHANAN, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Badge of Slavery Concept:  A Projec-
tion of Congressional Power, in THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM:  A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 175, 177 (1976); see also David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of 
“Jim Crow:”  A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 133, 149–51, 155 (1994) (defending Buchanan’s definition and applying it to 
homosexuals). 
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The past two decades have seen a surge in Thirteenth Amend-
ment scholarship.  While some have focused on expanding the judi-
cially enforceable coverage of Section 1 of the amendment,18 many 
have urged Congress to become more active in legislating under Sec-
tion 2.  Among the issues identified as “badges and incidents of sla-
very” and therefore within Congress’s purview are hate crimes,19 hate 
speech,20 racial profiling,21 disproportionate capital sentencing of 
black defendants,22 violence against women,23 sexual harassment,24 re-
productive rights,25 and gay marriage.26  For some, the concept of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” permits Congress to legislate for the 
special benefit of African Americans where there is a documented 
link between the identified problem and the institution of slavery and 
its historical aftermath.  For others, it is more elastic, allowing Con-
gress to pass legislation to address any oppressive behavior directed at 
any minority or powerless class of people. 
If Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment were to confer on 
Congress a broad anti-discrimination power, the Supreme Court’s re-
cent constriction of Congress’s power to legislate under Section 5 of 
 
 18 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery:  A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1992) (arguing that the Thir-
teenth Amendment provides remedies for victims of child abuse). 
 19 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (describing new hate crimes law). 
 20 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments:  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124, 126, 155–56 (1992) (arguing that the Court should have analyzed hate 
speech not only in terms of the First Amendment, but also the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments). 
 21 See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 
39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 20, 93 (2004) (arguing that racial profiling is a badge and 
incident of slavery redressable under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 22 See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
47–49 (1995) (arguing that the “disproportionate imposition of the death sentence on 
African Americans . . . is closely linked to the former system of slavery”). 
 23 See Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence 
Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1998) (invoking Section 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a source of Congress’s power to prohibit private instances of vi-
olence against women). 
 24 See Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment:  A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM. J. L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 519, 556 (1995) (arguing that sexual harassment is a badge of slavery). 
 25 See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom:  The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 403 (2000) 
(suggesting that the Thirteenth Amendment is a vehicle for achieving equality of repro-
ductive freedom between women of different races). 
 26 See Sarah C. Courtman, Comment, Sweet Land of Liberty:  The Case Against the Federal Mar-
riage Amendment, 24 PACE L. REV. 301, 328 (2003) (arguing that the inability of homosex-
ual people to form marriage contracts equates to a “badge and incident of slavery” and 
violates the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment27 would not be as consequential, as Sec-
tion 2 would present an alternative basis of legislative power.  Howev-
er, the self-executing rights conveyed by the two amendments are not 
identical, and therefore the conduct that Congress can reach under 
its enforcement powers under those amendments must be distinct.  
The Thirteenth Amendment promised the freed slaves “universal civil 
and political freedom.”28  The concept of the “badges and incidents 
of slavery” is meant to assist Congress in identifying ways in which it 
can fulfill that promise and, at the same time, to mark the outer 
boundaries of the Section 2 power.  Indeed, the terms “badge” and 
“incident” are terms of art that refer to specific aspects of the slave 
system and its legacy.  To suggest that Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment confers on Congress a broad power to legislate against 
discrimination generally overlooks this precise terminology and tends 
to devalue the immediate aftermath of the slave system, in which gov-
ernments and individuals alike sought to achieve the de facto reen-
slavement of four million African Americans. 
Accordingly, the goal of this Article is to provide a conceptual 
framework for interpreting and identifying the badges and incidents 
of slavery.  Such a framework not only will provide a sound basis for 
future Thirteenth Amendment scholarship but, even more impor-
tantly, will assist Congress in crafting Thirteenth Amendment legisla-
tion and the federal courts in policing the outer boundaries of the 
Section 2 enforcement power.  It will identify criteria by which mod-
ern social ills and injustices can be evaluated for redress under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Before proceeding, let me clarify what this Article does not do:  
First, it does not question that Congress can pass “pure” enforcement 
legislation under Section 2 to protect anyone, regardless of race, 
from any sort of privately or publicly sponsored slavery or involuntary 
servitude.  There is no question that Section 1’s ban on slavery and 
involuntary servitude applies to people of all races and prohibits pub-
lic and private action alike.29  Indeed, as new forms of involuntary ser-
vitude emerge (through human trafficking, for example), Congress 
undoubtedly has authority to pass legislation that would prevent, pro-
 
 27 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993). 
 28 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
 29 See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906) (“[The Thirteenth Amendment] 
reaches every race and every individual . . . .”). 
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scribe, and/or remedy that conduct.30  Legislation concerning the 
badges and incidents of slavery is a separate type of prophylactic en-
forcement legislation that Congress also can pass under the terms of 
Section 2.31  While exploring the meaning of the badges and inci-
dents of slavery will clarify the limits of Congress’s power under this 
latter head of its Section 2 power, it will not affect the scope of its 
“pure” enforcement power. 
Second, this Article does not question the scope of Congress’s 
other constitutional enforcement powers.  To the extent this Article 
concludes that certain types of conduct do not qualify as badges and 
incidents of slavery, that does not mean Congress is powerless to ad-
dress them.  The Commerce Clause, for example, might permit sub-
stantially similar legislative efforts.32  The goal is not to tell Congress 
on what topics it may or may not legislate as a general matter.  Ra-
ther, the goal is to guide Congress with respect to what topics it may 
or may not legislate under its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power. 
Third, this Article does not explore the scope of the right con-
veyed by Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment but takes as a given 
the prevailing judicial view that Section 1 bars only labor coerced by 
physical force or restraint.33  Although some have proposed more ex-
pansive understandings of “involuntary servitude,”34 hewing to cur-
rent doctrine for purposes of this Article has at least two advantages.  
First, it respects judicial supremacy, a value on which the Supreme 
Court has placed particular emphasis in explicating Congress’s role 
 
 30 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006) (penalizing sex trafficking). 
 31 See McAward, supra note 15, at 84 (distinguishing between “pure” enforcement legislation 
and prophylactic legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 32 Compare, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3 (striking down the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 because racial discrimination in public accommodations is not a badge or incident 
of slavery), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243 
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)) (invoking the Commerce 
power to forbid racial discrimination in public accommodations). 
 33 See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944–48 (1988) (holding that “involuntary 
servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment requires a showing of physical force 
or restraint in holding a laborer). 
 34 See, e.g., Amar & Widawsky, supra note 18 (arguing that child abuse is tantamount to sla-
very and therefore is barred by the Thirteenth Amendment).  Some have argued that 
Section 1 itself bars not just slavery, but any badge or incident thereof.  See ALEXANDER 
TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM:  A LEGAL HISTORY 90–91 
(2004) (“[U]nder the right circumstances, the Court might allow a claim directly under 
section I, even absent congressional action.”); William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment:  Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1311, 1349 (2007) (pointing out the disparity between a literal interpretation of the 
Amendment and Congress’s recognized powers to legislate beyond that interpretation).  
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in enforcing other Reconstruction amendments.35  Also, it acknowl-
edges the political reality that the Court is unlikely to alter prevailing 
Section 1 doctrine any time soon and therefore permits this Article to 
provide Congress meaningful guidance for its Thirteenth Amend-
ment enforcement efforts within the current legal landscape.  In-
deed, although this Article accepts a relatively narrow view of the 
scope of the Section 1 right, that view is not inconsistent with permit-
ting Congress to legislate with respect to the badges and incidents of 
slavery under its Section 2 power.  Such legislation is prophylactic, 
targeting the badges and incidents of slavery not because they are 
themselves unconstitutional, but because eradicating them is a means 
to the end of preventing the de facto reestablishment of slavery.36 
Finally, this Article does not seek to provide an exhaustive list of 
all “badges and incidents of slavery.”  Even if it were hypothetically 
possible to draft such a list, this task is better left to Congress in the 
first instance.  Congress is best suited to develop the factual and his-
torical record that surely must underpin any such classification.  The 
courts, in dialogue with Congress, are then suited to review such a 
finding.  The goal here, rather, is to develop a historical and legal 
understanding of the terms “badge” and “incident” as they relate to 
the American institution of slavery and its aftermath, and then to par-
lay that understanding into an objective methodology under which 
Congress and the courts can analyze the historical record and trans-
late that analysis into workable constraints on legislation. 
With that goal in mind, Part I of this Article attempts to determine 
the original public meaning of the terms “badge” and “incident” of 
slavery by examining the usage of those terms in the law of slavery, 
abolitionist writings, popular commentary in newspapers and speech-
es, antebellum judicial opinions, and the congressional debates over 
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  It then 
traces judicial usage of the phrase “badges and incidents of slavery” as 
 
 35 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (rejecting the contention that Con-
gress has the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation).  Admittedly, 
this Article proposes a major alteration of Supreme Court doctrine surrounding the Sec-
tion 2 power.  My willingness to rely on the Court’s Section 1 jurisprudence and yet re-
consider its Section 2 jurisprudence stems in large part from the tension between the 
Court’s explanation of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and the Court’s more recent (and more restrictive) in-
terpretation of Congress’s parallel Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in City of 
Boerne.  I assume that, given a proper case, the Court itself would be inclined to revisit 
Jones in light of City of Boerne.  Cf. McAward, supra note 15, at 146 n.391 (discussing appli-
cation of stare decisis to Jones). 
 36 See McAward, supra note 15, at 142–46 (explaining the advantages of, and necessary limi-
tations on, the prophylactic approach). 
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a legal term of art in the Thirteenth Amendment context, from its 
genesis in late-nineteenth century briefs and judicial opinions to its 
modern-day interpretation. 
Part II examines the ways in which Thirteenth Amendment scho-
lars have attempted to define the “badges and incidents of slavery.”  
The Supreme Court has said that Congress has the power to define 
the badges and incidents of slavery, subject only to rational basis re-
view.37  Many scholars have taken that as an invitation to invoke the 
concept freely and argue that Congress can address an array of mod-
ern injustices pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power.  However, there have been only limited instances where scho-
lars have treated the “badge or incident” language as a term of art 
and reflected on what criteria are relevant to identifying a badge or 
incident of slavery for Thirteenth Amendment purposes. 
Part III attempts to remedy this deficit.  It draws from the mate-
rials discussed in Part I to propose a principled definition of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”  It derives that definition by consi-
dering several variables in the analysis:  First, whom does the concept 
protect?  Should it apply to conduct directed against African Ameri-
cans specifically, against any person on the basis of her race, or 
against a wider array of minority groups?  Second, whose conduct 
does the concept govern?  Should it apply to public actors only?  Pri-
vate actors?  A subset of private actors whose conduct is widespread 
and/or influential?  Third, to what conduct does the concept apply?  
Is it enough to show a historical link to slavery and its aftermath?  Or 
should there be a causal element as well?  Part III ultimately con-
cludes that the best understanding of the “badges and incidents of 
slavery” refers to public or widespread private action, based on race 
or the previous condition of servitude, that mimics the law of slavery 
and that has significant potential to lead to the de facto reenslave-
ment or legal subjugation of the targeted group. 
In the end, this Article concludes that much of the current litera-
ture concerning the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment overshoots its target.  The definition of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” proposed in this Article is sufficient-
ly narrow that Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement pow-
er may well have limited applicability today.  Perhaps this is as it 
should be.  The concept of the “badges and incidents of slavery” was 
 
 37 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440 (“Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authori-
ty to translate that determination into effective legislation.”). 
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not meant to empower Congress to address all modern forms of in-
justice, or even all modern manifestations of racial bias.  Rather, it 
was designed to permit Congress to effectuate the promise made to 
the former slaves in 1865:  that freedom meant not just release from 
their shackles, but federal protection for a core set of civil rights that 
would enable them to enjoy full and meaningful citizenship.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power can justify certain legis-
lative efforts to address race discrimination, but Congress must turn 
to other sources of power to enact general civil rights protections. 
I.  HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE “BADGES” AND “INCIDENTS” 
OF SLAVERY 
As a phrase, the “badges and incidents of slavery” is unique to the 
Thirteenth Amendment context, used as a term of art for the first 
time in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.  Since then, it has been the au-
thoritative characterization of the subjects of Congress’s prophylactic 
enforcement power.  Many have asserted that some particular con-
duct constitutes a “badge and incident of slavery,” but only a few have 
attempted to define the term.  This Part seeks to determine, to the 
extent possible, the original meaning of the “badges of slavery” and 
“incidents of slavery” as well as to discern what the Civil Rights Cases 
Court meant when it coined the phrase “badges and incidents” and 
linked it to the Thirteenth Amendment. 
A.  Antebellum and Early Postbellum Use of the Terms 
The concepts of a “badge of slavery” and “incident of slavery” both 
predate the Thirteenth Amendment, appearing in antebellum judi-
cial opinions and secondary resources.  “Incident” was primarily a le-
gal term, used in a clear and consistent way.  The meaning of “badge” 
varied somewhat, as it appeared more often in popular commentary 
than legal analysis.  After the war, the meaning of “incident” re-
mained stable but that of “badge” continued to develop, particularly 
in legal parlance.  By examining usage of these terms in ante- and 
early postbellum sources, it is possible to draw some general conclu-
sions about their meaning by the time the Civil Rights Cases Court in-
voked them to describe the scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power. 
1. Incident 
The 1857 edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines an “incident” 
as “[a] thing depending upon, appertaining to, or following another, 
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called the principal.”38  Used in this sense, an “incident” of slavery was 
an aspect of the law that was inherently tied to or that flowed directly 
from the institution of slavery—a legal restriction that applied to 
slaves qua slaves or a legal right that inhered in slaveowners qua sla-
veowners. 
“Incident of slavery” was clearly a legal term of art, used often by 
antebellum courts and advocates discussing the “incidents” of owner-
ship of property in slaves.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,39 stated that because the Constitution’s Fugitive 
Slave Clause “contains a positive and unqualified recognition of the 
right of the owner in the slave . . . then all the incidents to that right 
attach also.”40  The Court highlighted “the right to seize or recapture” 
as a principal incident of the property right that inhered in slaveown-
ers, noting that this right “is universally acknowledged in all the slave-
holding states.”41  The Supreme Court of California also made clear 
that “where slavery exists, the right of property of the master in the 
slave must follows as a necessary incident.”42  The Supreme Court of 
Alabama, in Lee v. Mathews, specified that one “incident” of owner-
ship of female slaves was the owner’s property right in the children of 
such slaves.43 
The term “incident” was also used by antebellum courts to refer to 
legal constraints and conditions placed on slaves themselves.  The 
Supreme Court of Georgia, in Neal v. Farmer, included among the 
“many . . . incidents of slavery” the requirement that a slave obey the 
master’s commands or be subject “to beating, imprisonment, and 
every species of chastisement,” the prohibition on a slave “acquiring 
property for his own benefit,” and the status that a slave is “the sub-
ject of property—saleable and transmissible.”44  That same court pro-
vided a more expansive list in Bryan v. Walton, describing how free 
blacks were subject to 
the most humiliating incidents of his degradation.—Like the slave, the 
free person of color is incompetent to testify against a free white citizen.  
 
 38 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (7th ed. 1857). 
 39 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 40 Id. at 613. 
 41 Id. at 540.  Another example is found in the arguments of counsel in United States v. Amy, 
24 F. Cas. 792, 795 (C.C. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445) (Taney, J.).  In that case, a slave owner 
protested as a violation of the Takings Clause the imprisonment of his slave for violating a 
federal mail theft law.  Id. at 792.  He argued that uncompensated forfeiture was inconsis-
tent with the “incident of property in slaves,” and that “slave property is precisely like any 
other property, and . . . has identically the same legal incidents.”  Id. at 806. 
 42 Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 163 (1858). 
 43 10 Ala. 682, 689 (1846). 
 44 9 Ga. 555, 567 (1851). 
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He lives under, and is tried by the same Criminal Code.  He has neither 
vote nor voice in forming the laws by which he is governed.  He is not al-
lowed to keep or carry fire-arms.  He cannot preach or exhort without a 
special license, on pain of imprisonment, fine and corporeal punish-
ment.  He cannot be employed in mixing or vending drugs or medicines 
of any description.  A white man is liable to a fine of five hundred dollars 
and imprisonment in the common jail, at the discretion of the Court, for 
teaching a free negro to read and write; and if one free negro teach anoth-
er, he is punishable by fine and whipping, or fine or whipping, at the dis-
cretion of the Court.  To employ a free person of color to set up type in a 
printing office, or any other labor requiring a knowledge of reading or 
writing, subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding one hundred dol-
lars.45 
Of course, this list confirms that many substantial legal restraints ap-
plied to free blacks as well as slaves.  However, the fact that such re-
straints were not exclusively applicable to slaves does not defeat the 
claim that those same restraints were necessarily applicable to slaves.  
In this latter sense, then, such legal restrictions were necessary inci-
dents of slavery.46 
Scholars of the law of slavery also have used the term “incident” to 
refer to the legal aspects of the slave system.  First published in 1856, 
the second chapter of George Stroud’s Sketch of the Laws Relating to 
Slavery47 is entitled “Of the Incidents of Slavery—the Relation of Mas-
ter and Slave.”  In that chapter, Stroud discusses laws governing the 
power of the master to control a slave’s labor, food, clothing, and 
punishment; the slave’s status as chattel owned by the master; the 
slave’s lack of enforceable property and contract rights; and the 
slave’s lack of standing to sue the master or to obtain redress for cruel 
treatment.48  In the more recent Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619–
1860, Thomas Morris confirms that “the concept of property, the no-
tion of a person as a ‘thing,’ was obviously the central ‘incident’ of 
slavery.”49 
 
 45 14 Ga. 185, 202–03 (1853); see also Tom v. State, 27 Tenn. 86, 88 (1847) (terming as a 
“necessary incident to the institution of slavery” the duty of a runaway slave to submit to 
arrest). 
 46 I argue later in this piece that similar legal restrictions placed on free blacks, at least after 
the Civil War, constituted “badges of slavery.”  See infra pp. 578–81. 
 47 GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (Negro Univs. Press 1968) (1856). 
 48 Id. at 9–43. 
 49 THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 80 (1996); see also id. 
at 101, 130 (discussing inheritance, sale, and mortgage of slaves); STROUD, supra note 47, 
at 11 (stating that the “cardinal principle of slavery—that the slave is to be regarded as a 
thing,—is an article of property,—a chattel personal,—obtains as undoubted law in all of 
these states”). 
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The debates surrounding the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 186650 further 
confirm this usage of the term “incident of slavery.”  Although there 
was considerable debate as to the precise effect of the proposed 
amendment,51 some supporters, including Senator James Harlan of 
Iowa, asserted that the amendment abolished not only slavery but its 
“necessary incidents.”52  Harlan then listed the incidents of slavery in-
cluding “the prohibition of the conjugal relation,” the “aboli-
tion . . . of the parental relation,” the inability to “acquir[e] and 
hol[d] property,” the deprivation of “a status in court” and “the right 
to testify,” the “suppression of the freedom of speech and of the 
press,” and the deprivation of education.53  Similarly, during the de-
bates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Act’s 
primary proponent, explained that the bill would outlaw the “inci-
dents to slavery,” such as laws like the slave codes and the Black 
Codes54 “that prevented the colored man going from home, that did 
 
 50 The Civil Rights Act was proposed and defended as an exercise of Congress’s power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.  Its first section voided the Black Codes by provid-
ing, in relevant part, that all United States citizens  
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . . 
   Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 51 Some members of Congress asserted that the amendment had the sole effect of abolish-
ing slavery and had no bearing on individual rights.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 
1ST SESS. 1465 (1864) (statement of Sen. Henderson) (denying that the amendment con-
ferred “negro equality” and arguing that the amendment gave the freed slave “no right 
except his freedom”). 
 52 Id. at 1439–40 (statement of Sen. Harlan); see also id. at 1324 (statement of Rep. Wilson) 
(stating that the amendment “will obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave sys-
tem; . . . all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it”); Jacobus ten-
Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:  Consummation to Abolition 
and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 177 (1951) (discussing the con-
gressional statements of Wilson and Harlan). 
 53 CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1439 (1864). 
 54 The “Black Codes” were passed by each state of the former confederacy and sought to 
reimpose many of the legal restrictions that had applied to slaves prior to emancipation, 
particularly in relation to the exercise of contractual and civil rights.  For example, the 
codes required the freedmen to make annual written contracts for their labor and pro-
vided that they would be subject to arrest and forfeiture of the entirety of their annual 
wages if they left before the contract’s term.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 39 
(1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (decrying these codes as “degrading” and “arbitrary”).  
Vagrancy laws were strengthened in an effort to ensure that freedmen agreed to such 
contractual provisions; those who lacked a “home and support” were subject to arrest and 
enforced service to pay their debts.  Id.  For language of various states’ Black Codes, see 
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not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not al-
low him to own property; that did not allow him to enforce rights; 
that did not allow him to be educated.”55 
Judicial interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 followed quickly on the heels of their respec-
tive ratification and passage.  One of the first types of claims courts 
confronted involved payments due under contracts for the purchase 
of slaves.  Some courts initially held that the contracts were void in 
light of the Thirteenth Amendment, which had abolished “slavery 
and all its incidents, the laws supporting it, and all contracts based 
upon it.”56  The Supreme Court, however, eventually held that the 
creditors in such cases had a vested right to recover under such con-
tracts and that the Thirteenth Amendment did not destroy such 
vested rights by implication.57  The Court agreed with counsel for the 
creditors that the right to recover on such contracts was not “an inci-
dent to the right to hold slaves in bondage.”58  Rather, the incidents 
of slavery were “inchoate rights, wholly dependent upon the right to 
hold and sell slaves . . . [which] fell, with the abolition of slavery, as a 
part of it.”59  For our purposes, the important part of the debate is not 
the precise question of the contracts’ validity, but rather the assump-
tion held by both sides that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished 
 
EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29–44 (Negro Univs. Press, 2d ed. 1969) 
(1875). 
 55 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322–23 (1866) (“With the destruction of slavery 
necessarily follows the destruction of the incidents to slavery. . . [and] [w]ith the abolition 
of slavery should go all the badges of servitude which have been enacted for its mainten-
ance and support.”). 
 56 Austin v. Sandel, 19 La. Ann. 309, 315 (1867); see also Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846, 
855 (E.D. Ark. 1870) (holding slave contract unenforceable and asking whether anyone 
could doubt that it was “the object and purpose of these amendments to strike down sla-
very and all its incidents, and all rights of action based upon it”).  But see Jacoway v. Den-
ton, 25 Ark. 625, 625, 633 (1869) (holding that slave contracts were still enforceable even 
though “we may seriously condemn slavery, and every circumstance and incident atten-
dant upon it”). 
 57 See Osborne v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 662 (1871) (“[W]hen the thirteenth 
amendment . . . was adopted, the rights of the plaintiff in this action had become legally 
and completely vested.  Rights acquired by a . . . contract executed according to statutes 
subsequently repealed subsist afterwards, as they were before, in all respects as if the sta-
tutes were still in full force.”). 
 58 Appellant’s Brief at 5, Holmes v. Sevier, 154 U.S. 582 (1872) (No. 31); see also id. at 9–10 
(arguing that it was “absurd” to deem the contractual obligation “an incident of slavery” 
because “then the right to a farm, or a steam-mill, given in consideration of slaves, would 
be an incident of slavery, and the title would be divested, and would vest in the original 
owner upon the abolition of the institution”). 
 59 Id. at 6. 
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both slavery and its incidents, and that the incidents of slavery were 
the legal rights that necessarily accompanied the ownership of slaves. 
Accordingly, the concept of an “incident of slavery” was well-
developed in antebellum caselaw and commentary and quickly be-
came a term of art used by Congress and the Supreme Court to de-
scribe the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment.  An incident of sla-
very, as that term was used, was any legal right or restriction that nec-
essarily accompanied the institution of slavery.  Most often, “incident” 
was used to refer to the aspects of property law that applied to the 
ownership and transfer of slaves.  It also was used to refer to the civil 
disabilities imposed on slaves by virtue of their status as property.  In 
all, the term has clear, finite, historically determined meaning.  It 
refers to a closed set of public laws that applied in the antebellum sla-
veholding states.  Identifying an “incident of slavery,” then, is an ex-
ercise in historical inquiry. 
2. Badge 
While “badge of slavery” was a relatively common phrase before 
1883, it was used more in a rhetorical rather than legal context.  It is 
possible to identify a range of meanings for the term but difficult to 
define it precisely.  Indeed, its meaning appeared to evolve from the 
antebellum to postbellum eras, particularly as it migrated from collo-
quial to legal use. 
According to mid-nineteenth century dictionaries, the term 
“badge” referred to “[a] mark or sign worn by some persons, or 
placed upon certain things for the purpose of designation.”60  It could 
be used in a literal (e.g., “badge of authority”61) or figurative (e.g., 
“badge of fraud”62) sense.  In its most general sense, the term “badge 
of slavery” therefore refers to indicators, physical or otherwise, of 
African Americans’ slave or subordinate status. 
As Professor George Rutherglen has pointed out, the phrase 
“badge of slavery” was used metaphorically as far back as the Roman 
 
 60 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 151 (7th ed. 1857); see also WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 93 (Fallows ed., 1900) (reprinting definitions 
from 1864 ed.) (defining “badge” as “[a] mark, sign, token, or thing, by which a person is 
distinguished, in a particular place or employment, and designating his relation to a per-
son or to a particular occupation; as, the badge of authority”). 
 61 WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE supra note 60, at 93 
(reprinting definitions from 1864 edition). 
 62 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (noting that “badge” can be “used figuratively 
when we say, possession of personal property by the seller, is a badge of fraud” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Empire to refer to “evidence of political subjugation.”63  Indeed, in 
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith used the phrase to refer to trade 
and manufacture restrictions placed by the British on the colonies.64 
Between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, however, the phrase 
“badge of slavery” acquired a more specific range of meanings in 
American discourse with reference to the institution of slavery.  In 
those years, the most consistent use of “badge of slavery” in both legal 
and political discourse referred to the skin color of African Ameri-
cans.  In some states and some courts, dark skin was presumptively a 
“mark or sign” of slave status.65  As a Delaware state court explained in 
1840, because “the condition, or status, of slavery could be predicated 
only of the negro and mulatto, their color became the badge of that 
status.”66  As a consequence, some legal restrictions that applied to 
slaves, like the bar on testimony in any case involving a white person, 
also applied to free blacks because they also wore the badge of sla-
very.67 
Antebellum legal references to the “badge of slavery” were rela-
tively infrequent, but the term was commonly used in the rhetoric of 
abolitionists as well as the mainstream press.  Many an abolitionist 
wrote longingly of the day when “the hue of the skin shall no longer 
be a badge of servitude and opprobrium.”68  Indeed, the federal gov-
ernment’s official notice calling for black soldiers to fight in the war 
noted that, “[o]ne cannot exaggerate the call sounding in the ears of 
 
 63 See George Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY:  THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY 
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 163, 166 & n.23 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 
2010) (citing P. CORNELIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS AND THE HISTORIES bk. XV, at 31 
(1952)) (recounting incident where a victorious general was asked to treat a conquered 
king so that he “might not have to endure any badge of slavery”); see also id. at n.19 (citing 
use of phrase during English Civil War). 
 64 See Rutherglen, supra note 63 at 166 (quoting 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY IN THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, ch. 7 at 582 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 
Liberty Fund 1981) (1776)) (explaining that trade restrictions “are only the impertinent 
badges of slavery imposed upon [the colonies] . . . without any sufficient reason . . . [by] 
the mother country”). 
 65 See MORRIS, supra note 49, at 21. 
 66 State v. Whitaker, 3 Del. 549, 550 (1840); see also State v. Rash, 6 Del. 271, 274 (Del. Ct. 
Gen. Sess. 1867) (“As slavery was exclusively confined to the black or colored race, color 
became the badge or sign of servitude . . . .”). 
 67 See Rash, 6 Del. at 273–74; Whitaker, 3 Del. at 550. 
 68 Gerrit Smith, Editorial, THE LIBERATOR, March 7, 1835, at 39; see also, e.g., VT. CHRONICLE 
(Bellow Falls), July 18, 1834, at 116 (reprinting speech by Dr. Lyman Beecher which 
stated in part that “[h]ad Africans been the oppressors, and Americans the slaves, white 
complexion and straight hair would have been the badges of servitude and the occasions 
of prejudice; but since prejudice is the result of condition and character, it is invincible 
till the causes which created it are removed”). 
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all men, in whose veins flows the blood of Africa, and whose color has 
been the badge of slavery.”69 
This was not the sole use of the phrase in abolitionist and other 
commentary, however.  Some authors articulated concern that slavery 
had undermined the dignity of work and that labor itself was viewed 
“as a badge of slavery, and consequently as a degradation.”70  Others 
identified psychological scars as the “badge of servitude, sunken deep 
into [a slave’s] mental constitution by the bondage of ages.”71  Still 
others used the term to refer to legal restrictions that accompanied 
slavery72 or even to slavery generally.73 
Accordingly, before the Civil War, the concept of a “badge of sla-
very” was used widely in anti-slavery writings and the popular media 
and, to a lesser extent, in judicial writings.  The term had variable 
meaning, although it was used predominantly to refer to the color of 
a slave’s skin.  Indeed, the few judicial uses of the term used it in this 
sense.  After the Civil War, however, the use of the term “badge of 
slavery” waned in popular discourse but obtained more widespread 
use in the legal world.  With this migration, the term also took on a 
new range of meanings that reflected the reality of emancipation.  
Skin color was no longer a badge of slavery.74  Instead, the term was 
used to reference ways in which southern governments and white citi-
zens endeavored to reimpose upon freed slaves the incidents of sla-
 
 69 THE LIBERATOR (Boston), Jan. 1, 1864, at 4. 
 70 THE EMANCIPATOR (New York), Nov. 1, 1838, at 108; see also The Anti-Labor Party, NEW 
HAVEN DAILY PALLADIUM, Feb. 5, 1863) (“[I]n the South slavery has made labor the 
badge of servitude.”). 
 71 Frederick Douglass, “Henry Clay,” THE NORTH STAR (Rochester), Mar. 23, 1849, at 2.  In 
this piece, Frederick Douglass reviewed a letter by Henry Clay regarding the prospects of 
emancipation.  Presciently, Douglass articulated concern that even after emancipation, 
there would be “long and dark . . . years through which the freed bondman will have to 
pass” to cleanse himself of the badge of slavery.  Id. 
 72 See Affairs at the National Capital:  Interesting Debate in the United States Senate, N.Y. HERALD, 
Mar. 14, 1858, at 1 (reprinting congressional debate on the “Kansas question” and quot-
ing Mr. Wade of Ohio as saying that “[t]he fugitive slave bill . . . is a badge of servitude 
and subjection [on the northern states] that cannot be tolerated by freeman”); Hamilton, 
The Marriage Bill, The LIBERATOR (Boston), June 11, 1831, at 1 (arguing that a proposed 
law legalizing interracial marriage would “remove . . . a disgraceful badge of servi-
tude . . . [and] declare [blacks’ and whites’] natural equality as human beings”). 
 73 See The Voice of Delaware, VT. CHRONICLE, Mar. 17, 1847, at 43 (reprinting Delaware state 
resolution that noted that “the badge of slavery” had devalued slaveholding land in that 
state). 
 74 See WHIG & COURIER (Bangor), July 13, 1865, at 1 (reprinting public letter by Governor of 
Maine) (“By the Emancipation Proclamation and the concurring legislation of Congress 
and the States, amending the organic law of the land, slavery has been abolished 
throughout the United States.  Color is no longer a badge of servitude  . . .”). 
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very or, more generally, to restrict their rights in such a way as to 
mark them as a subordinate brand of citizens. 
Compared to the antebellum era, the rhetorical use of “badge of 
slavery” was quite rare in post-war public and political commentary.75  
During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the bill’s spon-
sor, Senator Lyman Trumbull, used “badges of servitude” only twice, 
both times as a synonym for the “incidents of slavery.”76  He defined a 
badge of servitude as “any statute which is not equal to all, and which 
deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citi-
zens.”77 
The concept’s use as a legal term of art accelerated starting in the 
late 1860s when a trio of Supreme Court Justices began to transform 
and broaden the usage of “badge of slavery.”  Starting in 1866, Justic-
es Swayne, Bradley, and Woods regularly invoked the “badge of sla-
very” concept to refer to the broader set of political, civil, and legal 
disadvantages imposed on slaves, former slaves, and free blacks.  Jus-
tice Swayne (riding circuit) authored United States v. Rhodes,78 the first 
federal case to assess the scope of Congress’s Section 2 enforcement 
power and evaluate the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  In the course of 
upholding the Act, he surveyed the law of slavery and the legal treat-
ment of free blacks and freed slaves.  After detailing the incidents of 
slavery, i.e., state laws that deprived slaves of contract and property 
rights and made it a crime to educate slaves,79 Swayne commented 
that “[t]he shadow of the evil [of slavery] fell upon the free blacks.  
They had but few civil and no political rights in the slave states.  Many 
of the badges of the bondman’s degradation were fastened upon 
them.”80  Thus, Swayne equated the “badges of . . . degradation” with 
the incidents of slavery and recognized that those legal constraints 
applied to free blacks. 
 
 75 Only a few examples of the term’s use in public commentary exist.  See, e.g., Op-Ed., The 
Consitutional Amendement, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Philadelphia), Oct. 5, 1869 (denounc-
ing attempts to deny suffrage to African Americans as “making badges of servitude where 
none should exist”); see also Not According to Murray, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Philadelphia) 
Apr. 22, 1875 (arguing that freed blacks were “idle and worthless” because “the ruling 
race . . . made labor a badge of servitude and wrong”). 
 76 See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) 
(“Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that did not allow him to 
buy or sell, or to make contracts . . . were all badges of servitude. . . .”). 
 77 Id. at 474. 
 78 27 F. Cas. 785 (D. Ky. 1866) (Swayne, J., on circuit). 
 79 Id. at 793 (describing laws of Georgia, Virginia, Alabama, and Louisiana). 
 80 Id. 
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The concept appeared again five years later in the dissenting opi-
nion in Blyew v. United States.81  In that case, Kentucky law barred two 
African-American witnesses from testifying at a criminal trial about 
the murder of a third African American.82  Although the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 gave the federal courts jurisdiction over cases “affecting 
persons” who are denied the right to testify in state court because of 
their race, the Blyew majority held that the fact that the murder victim 
was African American was insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction 
because the victim was not a “person in existence.”83  Justice Bradley, 
joined by Justice Swayne, dissented, arguing that any case in which 
the crime victim—dead or alive—was African American fell under the 
purview of the Civil Rights Act.84  To “deprive a whole class” of the 
right to complain and testify in criminal matters, Bradley argued, “is 
to brand them with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton 
insults and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and 
their property unprotected by law.”85  Thus, as in Rhodes, the “badge 
of slavery” concept referred to a deprivation of civil rights legally im-
posed on African Americans. 
In 1874, Justice Bradley (riding circuit) considered the scope of 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in United 
States v. Cruikshank.86  In considering the constitutionality of the En-
forcement Act of 1870, Bradley pointed to the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 as the paradigm of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement legis-
lation.  In his view, the Amendment not only eradicated slavery but 
also “bestow[ed] liberty” on the former slaves.87  Because  
disability to be a citizen and enjoy equal rights was deemed one form or 
badge of servitude, it was supposed that congress had the power, under 
the amendment, to settle this point of doubt, and place the other races 
on the same plane of privilege as that occupied by the white race.88   
The Civil Rights Act eliminated this “badge of servitude” for African 
Americans and thus was squarely within Congress’s Section 2 power.89  
However, Bradley found that the Enforcement Act of 1870 was un-
supported by that power because it did not limit its protection to 
 
 81 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 596–97 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 82  Id. at 583. 
 83 Id. at 592–93. 
 84 See id. at 598–99 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also id. at 599 (calling the majority’s “view of 
the law too narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects . . . [the Civil 
Rights Act] had in view”). 
 85 Id. at 599. 
 86 25 F. Cas. 707, 707–08 (D. La. 1874), aff’d on other grounds, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 87 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 711. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. 
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those who were injured or deprived of equal rights “because of 
[their] race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”90  Justice Brad-
ley’s Cruikshank opinion, then, illuminates the concept of the badges 
of slavery in two different ways.  First, he deemed the restrictions im-
posed by law on African Americans (on citizenship, property rights, 
contract rights, testimonial privileges, etc.) to be the badges of sla-
very.  Second, such legal restrictions were badges of slavery only when 
applied to a person “by reason of his race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.”91  In other words, while Section 2 empowered Con-
gress to address the badges of slavery, that concept was limited to le-
gal restrictions placed on African Americans or others because of 
their race or experience as slaves. 
With respect to this latter point, Justice Woods endorsed an even 
stricter limitation on who might be subject to the badges of slavery in 
his opinion (riding circuit) in LeGrand v. United States.92  LeGrand held 
that Congress lacked power to pass Section 2 of the Force Act of 
1871, which penalized conspiracies to deprive “any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or 
immunities under the laws.”93  Justice Woods reiterated that Section 2 
of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress power “not only to 
protect the personal freedom of the enfranchised citizens, but to re-
move from them every badge and restraint of slavery and involuntary 
servitude.”94  However, he noted that the statutory language would 
permit the prosecution of “two or more free white men . . . for con-
spiring to deprive another free white man of the right to testify,” or 
the same conspiracy by “two or more colored persons . . . against a 
white citizen, or against a colored citizen who had [never] been a 
slave.”95  With this broad coverage, the statute “cannot be based on 
the amendment which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.”96  
In Justice Woods’s view, the power to remove “every badge and re-
straint of slavery and involuntary servitude” could not justify federal 
 
 90 Id. at 712. 
 91  Id.   
 92 12 F. 577 (E.D. Tex. 1882) (holding that Section 2 of the Force Act of 1871 was too broad 
to be supported by Congress’s enforcement powers under the Constitution). 
 93 REV. STAT. tit. 70, § 5519, 70 Stat. 1076 (1875).  The Supreme Court as a whole agreed 
with Justice Woods in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).  The same language is 
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006).  The Supreme Court upheld the statute 
against Thirteenth Amendment challenge in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 
(1971), distinguishing Harris because Harris followed a now-discarded view that overbroad 
statutes should be invalidated in their entirety rather than treated as severable. 
 94 LeGrand, 12 F. at 581. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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legislation to protect the rights of white people, or even African 
Americans who had not been slaves. 
Thus, prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, the concept of a 
“badge of slavery” had a relatively narrow range of meanings, refer-
ring to the color of an African American’s skin or other indications of 
legal and social inferiority connected with slavery.  In the years im-
mediately following the Thirteenth Amendment, however, the con-
cept became more of a term of art that referred to legal restrictions 
imposed by states on the civil rights of freed slaves.  This shift in par-
lance makes sense.  Prior to emancipation, slaves were necessarily 
subject to the legal incidents of their status.  The only people subject 
to badges of slavery were free blacks who, by virtue of their skin color, 
were generally deemed inferior and often were subject to state laws 
that imposed on them some of the same legal restrictions imposed on 
slaves.  After emancipation, however, color alone was no longer a 
badge of servitude.  All people of African descent were free; nobody 
was subject to the legal incidents of slavery. 
At the same time, however, the demise of slavery brought wide-
spread state and private efforts to selectively reimpose its incidents 
and other civil disadvantages on the freedmen.  The Black Codes 
were the first and paradigmatic example of such efforts, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which voided the Black Codes, therefore became 
the first and paradigmatic example of “appropriate” Section 2 legisla-
tion.  Because the 1866 Act was litigated heavily, Justices Swayne, 
Bradley, and Woods had multiple opportunities to opine on the 
Black Codes and, in so doing, to transform the meaning of a “badge 
of slavery” to be a post-war synonym for the incidents of slavery. 
The question, then, becomes whether to focus on the precise 
manner in which Justices Swayne, Bradley, and Woods used the term 
“badge of slavery,” or to attach greater importance to the fact that the 
term’s meaning evolved as southern society developed new ways to 
secure the legally inferior status of the freed slaves.  In other words, 
had the meaning of “badge of slavery” finished its evolution by 1883, 
or was it still evolving?  If the former, then “badge of slavery” has a 
meaning every bit as settled as “incident of slavery.”  If the latter, 
however, “badge of slavery” could obtain new layers of meaning over 
time.  While skin color was a badge of slavery before the war, the 
Black Codes imposed such a badge immediately after the war.  After 
the demise of the Black Codes, the governments and citizens of the 
American South utilized less formal but equally virulent means—
including widespread violence and discrimination, disparate en-
forcement of racially neutral laws, and eventually, Jim Crow laws—to 
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keep the freed slaves in an inferior status.  These all could be re-
garded as fitting within the evolving meaning of the badges of slavery. 
This question—whether “badge of slavery” had a static or evolving 
meaning—was at the heart of the Civil Rights Cases, as the Justices 
considered whether to treat widespread discrimination and oppres-
sion in the post-Reconstruction South as a badge of slavery that Con-
gress could address under its Section 2 power. 
B.  The Civil Rights Cases 
The Civil Rights Cases presented the Supreme Court’s first oppor-
tunity to evaluate the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment.  The case involved the first section of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, which provided that 
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to 
the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, 
and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and 
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every 
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.97 
The Act initially was introduced in Congress in 1870,98 and its 
preamble set forth its purpose of “recogniz[ing] the equality of all 
men before the law.”99  The congressional debates regarding the Act’s 
constitutional basis focused primarily on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,100 although Senator Frelinghuysen did argue that the law also 
was “appropriate to efface the existence of any consequence or resi-
duum of slavery.”101 
 
 97 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (protecting all citizens in their civil and 
legal rights). 
 98 The original version of the Act proposed by Senator Sumner barred race discrimination 
in railroads, steamboats, public conveyances, hotels, licensed theaters, houses of public 
entertainment, cemeteries, jury duty, and public schools.  See Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 W. POL. Q. 763, 763, 765 (1965).  The final version omitted ce-
meteries and public schools from the Act’s coverage.  See 18 Stat. at 336. 
 99 18 Stat. at 335.  The Preamble also declared the purposes of “met[ing] out equal and ex-
act justice to all” and “enact[ing] great fundamental principles into law.” Id. 
100 CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 576–78 (1871) (statement of Sen. Carpenter). 
101 2 CONG. REC. 3453 (1874).  By contrast, Senator Allen Thurman of Ohio, in the course of 
denouncing the Act, declared that “neither the thirteenth nor the fifteenth amendment 
has anything whatever to do with this question.”  3 CONG. REC. 1791 (1875).  Interesting-
ly, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who had sponsored the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and pro-
moted an expansive view of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, op-
posed early versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  (He had retired from the Senate 
when the Act finally passed.)  In his view, the 1866 Act “went to the verge of constitutional 
authority” by giving the freed slaves “the rights that belong to the individual as man and 
as a freeman under the Constitution of the United States.”  CONG GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 2D 
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By the time the Civil Rights Act reached the Supreme Court, 
though, the United States Solicitor General’s office explicitly de-
fended the law on Thirteenth as well as Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.  The Civil Rights Cases were five consolidated cases in which 
operators of hotels, transportation companies, and theaters were 
prosecuted for denying African Americans equal access to their facili-
ties.  Each posed the question of the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875. 
Justice Bradley authored the majority opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases, holding that neither the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth Amend-
ments provided authority for Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  
Justice Woods joined the opinion.102  Consistent with his opinion in 
Cruikshank, Bradley articulated a strong view of the effect of Section 1 
of the Thirteenth Amendment as “abolish[ing] slavery and estab-
lish[ing] universal [civil and political] freedom.”103  He then articu-
lated what has since become the standard description of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power as the “power to pass all 
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of 
slavery in the United States.”104  Although Bradley made clear that this 
grant permits Congress to pass legislation that is “direct and primary, 
operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State 
legislation or not,”105 it also restricts Congress to the subject matter of 
“slavery.”  “[D]istinctions of race, or class, or color,” Bradley ex-
plained, are in the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment and, by 
the terms of that amendment, constrain only state action.106 
In light of the decisional law that preceded the Civil Rights Cases, it 
was no surprise that Justice Bradley invoked the concept of the “inci-
dents of slavery” to describe the scope of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.  However, the phrase “badges and 
incidents” was a new characterization of Congress’s power, and its use 
raises the question whether it was meant to signal an enhanced or 
more expansive view of that power. 
In Justice Bradley’s understanding, the answer appears to be “no.”  
His analysis reveals little, if any, distinction between the “badges” and 
 
SESS. 901 (1872).  However, he deemed schooling and transportation to be “political” or 
“social” rights over which Congress lacked the power to legislate.  Id.; see also id. at 3189. 
102 Justice Swayne retired from the Court two years before the Civil Rights Cases were decided. 
103 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
104 Id.  Later in the opinion, he stated that the Thirteenth Amendment “has only to do with 
slavery and its incidents,” perhaps indicating that, in his mind, the “badges” and “inci-
dents” of slavery were synonymous.  Id. at 23. 
105 Id. at 23. 
106 Id. at 24. 
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“incidents” of slavery.  Rather, his use of those terms indicates that he 
used both to refer to post-emancipation public laws that reimposed 
the legal restrictions of slavery.107  As in Cruikshank, he pointed to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as “wip[ing] out . . . the necessary incidents of 
slavery” and securing “those fundamental rights which are the es-
sence of civil freedom.”108  And he concluded that a private party’s re-
fusal to accommodate a person on the basis of that person’s race, 
“without any sanction or support from any State law or regulation,” 
cannot “be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servi-
tude upon the applicant.”109  Private discriminatory conduct, Bradley 
argued, was “an ordinary civil injury . . . subject to redress 
by . . . [state] laws.”110 
As support for his conclusion, Bradley pointed to the treatment of 
free blacks before the abolition of slavery: 
[They] enjoy[ed] all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the 
same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any in-
vasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to 
all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to 
discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public 
conveyances and places of amusement.111 
In a passage telling of his limited view of the applicability of the 
“badges and incidents” concept beyond public law, Bradley stated 
that “[m]ere discriminations [against free blacks] on account of race 
or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”112  Moreover, “[i]t 
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it 
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain.”113  Thus, the Court per Justice 
Bradley endorsed the “static” view of the “badges of slavery,” equating 
them with post-war state laws that selectively reimposed the legal in-
cidents of slavery. 
 
107 Justice Bradley listed the “burdens and incapacities” that were the “necessary incidents of 
slavery” in this country, namely, compulsory service, restraint of movement, disability to 
hold property, make contracts, having standing in court, and be a witness against a white 
person, and more severe punishments imposed on slaves than free for the same offenses.  
Id. at 22. 
108 Id.  Interestingly, unlike his opinion in Cruikshank, Bradley hedged on whether the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was fully supported by the Thirteenth Amendment or also by the Four-
teenth Amendment.  See id. 
109 Id. at 23–24. 
110 Id. at 24. 
111 Id. at 25. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 24. 
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Solicitor General Samuel F. Phillips, who defended the Act on be-
half of the United States,114 and Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent, 
both embraced—at least implicitly—the evolutionary view of the 
“badges of slavery.”  Phillips’ brief contains the first recorded argu-
ment that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Con-
gress to legislate against certain types of private conduct as a prophy-
lactic means of preventing the reestablishment of the institutions of 
slavery or involuntary servitude.  Harlan’s argument drew from Phil-
lips’ but differed from it in some critical ways.  Accordingly, it is im-
portant to examine both arguments in detail, as they provide differ-
ent ways of conceptualizing the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 
Solicitor General Phillips argued that when a private actor who 
serves the public discriminates against African Americans in a way 
that mimics the legal incidents of slavery and reflects the views of the 
community at large, Section 2 permits federal intervention because 
this conduct poses the risk of reinvigorating the institutions of slavery 
or involuntary servitude.  Phillips began his argument by noting that 
the discriminatory conduct at issue in the cases affected African 
Americans’ ability to travel.  Such a “[r]estraint upon the right of lo-
comotion was a well-known feature of the slavery abolished by the 
thirteenth amendment . . . [an] incident . . . of the very essence of 
the institution.”115 
Phillips then asserted that if a state directly imposed such an inci-
dent of slavery, that state action would be “plainly unconstitutional” 
and would “warrant, and even demand, legislation by Congress” in re-
sponse.116  Identical action by certain types of private actors permits a 
similar congressional response.  In particular, discrimination by pri-
vate actors whose businesses are “devoted to a public use, and so affected 
 
114 In 1879, the United States, then represented by Attorney General Charles Devens and 
Assistant Attorney General Edwin B. Smith, submitted a brief to the Supreme Court in 
three of the consolidated cases (Stanley, Ryan, and Nichols).  In that brief, the United 
States defended the Act primarily on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, although it did 
assert Thirteenth Amendment grounds as well.  However, the case was reargued three 
years later.  The brief of Samuel F. Phillips, who was then the Solicitor General, was the 
only submission to the Court to discuss the constitutional basis for the Act.  The defen-
dants-respondents did not file any briefs or make any appearances before the Court.  In-
terestingly, the vast majority of Phillips’ argument focused on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 
115 Brief for the United States at 15, 21, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  Later in 
the brief, Phillips defines an “incident of slavery” as “a temperate expression of the law as 
received in the States in which slavery prevailed.”  Id. at 23. 
116 Id. at 20.  “Inasmuch, then, as in times of slavery legislation like the act of 1875 would 
have touched that institution at the quick, its specific relation thereto can readily be rec-
ognized.”  Id. at 23. 
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with a public [State] interest” is of greater significance and effect be-
cause it is a “reflection of the views of the community” and “tends to en-
large . . . a particular current in public opinion, and thus in its turn is 
fruitful of public, i.e., State, institutions.”117  Such private action 
“points not remotely to the birth of corresponding State institu-
tions.”118  Therefore,  
 it is “appropriate legislation” against . . . [the institutions of slavery and 
involuntary servitude] to forbid any action by private persons which in 
the light of our history may reasonably be apprehended to tend, on ac-
count of its being incidental to quasi public occupations to create an in-
stitution . . . viz, custom &c. [of involuntary servitude].119   
“[E]very rootlet of slavery has an individual vitality, and, to its minut-
est hair, should be anxiously followed and plucked up . . . .”120 
Even though Philips did not use the terms “badge” or “incident” 
of slavery, it is possible to derive from his argument a theory of the 
“badges of slavery” that Congress may address under its Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.  In addition to public laws that 
reimpose the incidents of slavery, badges of slavery are also private 
acts of racial discrimination that mirror the incidents of slavery, 
wrought by non-governmental actors who operate in a public context 
and whose actions reflect—and contribute to—community values.  
This aspect of Philips’ argument recognizes that severe bias against 
African Americans was an integral aspect of the slave system that did 
not cease to operate with emancipation.  When that bias finds voice 
and force in the actions of community leaders and businesses that 
serve the public, it threatens to stoke public sentiment and contribute 
to widespread custom that recreates a de facto institution of slavery 
where people of minority races are prevented from exercising the 
rights of free people.121 
In his famous dissent, Justice Harlan articulated a view of the Sec-
tion 2 power that fits somewhere in between those espoused by Jus-
 
117 Id. at 19, 24.  Phillips argued that discrimination by innkeepers and passenger carriers, in 
particular, reflects the “views of whole communities of citizens.”  Id. at 24.  By contrast, 
“mere scattered trespasses against liberty committed by private persons” are isolated 
events that Congress cannot reach under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Id. at 16.  “There 
is no reason to apprehend that acts of mere violence may become a political institution.”  
Id. at 24. 
118 Id. at 24. 
119 Id. at 16.  “[I]t is in the interest of national peace and good feeling to nip such institu-
tions in the bud.”  Id. at 24. 
120 Id. at 25. 
121 This possibility seemed a real threat to Phillips in the early 1880s.  Whether it is a realistic 
threat today—and whether that should be the measure of Section 2 legislation—is dis-
cussed below.  See infra Part III.C. 
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tice Bradley and Solicitor General Phillips.  Harlan began, as Bradley 
did, by characterizing as “indisputable” that Section 2 empowered 
Congress to “eradicat[e] not simply . . . the institution [of slavery],” 
but also the “burdens and disabilities which constitute badges [and 
incidents] of slavery and servitude . . . its substance and visible 
form.”122  Although Harlan conceded that Section 2 did not enable 
Congress “to define and regulate the entire body of the civil rights 
which citizens enjoy . . . in the several States,”123 he asserted that Sec-
tion 2 did empower Congress to “enact laws to protect . . . [freed 
slaves] against the deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights 
granted to other freemen in the same State.”124  He argued that the 
core premise of slavery was the inferiority of African Americans, and 
therefore that the Thirteenth Amendment’s grant of freedom neces-
sarily required protection of freedmen against race discrimination.  
Congress’s legislative power, however, was limited to the actions of 
“States, their officers and agents, and . . . such individuals and corpo-
rations as exercise public functions and wield power and authority 
under the state.”125 
Thus, Justice Harlan envisioned three requirements for legislative 
efforts to address the badges and incidents of slavery.  First, such ef-
forts must be made for the particular benefit of African Americans.  
Second, such efforts must seek to redress race discrimination in civil 
rights.  And third, legislation may impose duties on state and private 
actors who exercise “public functions.”  Justice Harlan noted that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 certainly satisfied these requirements126 but 
also concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 satisfied them as well. 
With respect to each category of public conveyances, inns, and 
places of public amusement, Harlan detailed the high level of state 
licensure, control and regulation of each, concluding that each type 
of business performed either a “public or quasi-public function[].”127  
Moreover, he asserted that “the power of locomotion” is an aspect of 
personal liberty at the “essence of civil freedom.”128  Because race-
based restrictions on that power were “burdens which lay at the very 
foundation of the institution of slavery,”129 he concluded that such 
discrimination by the actors in question “is a badge of servitude the 
 
122  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 36. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 36–37. 
127 See id. at 37–43 (detailing state control over rates, safety, licensure, etc.). 
128 Id. at 39. 
129 Id. 
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imposition of which Congress may prevent under its [Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement] power.”130 
Thus, from the briefing and opinions in the Civil Rights Cases, we 
see three different approaches to conceptualizing the “badges and 
incidents of slavery” subject to congressional legislation.  The nar-
rowest view, endorsed by Justice Bradley for the majority, equates 
“badges” with “incidents” and holds that Congress may act to prevent 
states from enacting public laws or taking official action that would 
reimpose the legal restrictions of slavery.  Justice Harlan and Solicitor 
General Phillips’ views, while both broader than Bradley’s, have great 
similarities but also significant differences.  As to the particular con-
duct, both deemed something a badge of slavery if it mirrored a legal 
incident of slavery or infringed upon an aspect of liberty denied to 
slaves.  Harlan indicated that the conduct must discriminate against 
African Americans while Phillips seemed to assume such a restriction 
but did not specifically articulate it.  As to the actors capable of im-
posing a “badge and incident of slavery,” both Harlan and Phillips 
agreed that certain private parties were subject to congressional regu-
lation.  While both indicated that the appropriate private actors 
would be business owners who served some sort of “public interest,” 
Harlan appeared to regard that as a somewhat narrower set than Phil-
lips.  Harlan treated as “public or quasi-public” only businesses for 
which there was doctrinal legal support for such a classification.  Phil-
lips took a less formal approach, looking at any private business that 
was “devoted to a public use” and whose actions had potential to 
stoke public sentiment.  However, Phillips added an additional ele-
ment, requiring a likely causal link between the private conduct and 
reestablishment of slavery.  Harlan’s analysis lacked an explicit re-
quirement of causation. 
Accordingly, the Civil Rights Cases marked a critical moment for 
understanding the scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement power.  The majority articulated what has become the au-
thoritative view of the appropriate targets of congressional action, 
namely the “badges and incidents of slavery.”  The majority’s limited 
view of the coverage of that concept is largely consistent with the 
judicial usage of its component parts (i.e., “badges” and “incidents”) 
up to that point.  However, the Solicitor General’s brief and Justice 
Harlan’s dissent point to a broader understanding of the “badges and 
incidents of slavery” that might better account for and respond to the 
legacy of slavery and the southern response to emancipation, which 
 
130 Id. at 43. 
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was broader, deeper, and more virulent than a set of discriminatory 
state laws.  As it was, however, the Civil Rights Cases embraced a view 
of the “badges and incidents of slavery” that substantially cabined 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power for the eighty-five years 
that followed. 
C.  Post-Civil Rights Cases Interpretations 
The Civil Rights Cases marked the beginning of a long period of 
legislative and judicial neglect of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Con-
gress enacted no new legislation pursuant to its Section 2 power.  And 
the federal courts took increasingly restrictive approaches to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, ruling, for example, in Plessy v. Ferguson that 
a Louisiana law that mandated railroads to maintain “equal but sepa-
rate accommodations for the white, and colored races”131 did not im-
pose a “badge of slavery or servitude.”132 
In 1906, Hodges v. United States marked the nadir of Thirteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, when—despite years of dicta to the con-
trary—the Court held that Congress lacked the power to pass the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1866.133  In Hodges, the Court struck down the convic-
tions of several white men convicted of threatening and harassing 
African-American workers at a sawmill, and thereby denying them of 
their right under the Act to make and enforce contracts without re-
gard to race.  The Court held that Section 2 permitted Congress to 
legislate regarding the actual condition of slavery, but not its badges 
and incidents.134 
 
131 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). 
132 Id. at 542–43 (finding that the law had “no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the 
two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude”).  Plessy involved a challenge to a 
state, not federal, law and therefore the Court was not in a position to pass definitively on 
Congress’s Section 2 power.  However, Plessy goes one step farther than the Civil Rights 
Cases, indicating that a state law that required segregation would not be redressable by 
Congress.  Justice Harlan again dissented, concluding that “[t]he arbitrary separation of 
citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude 
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by 
the Constitution.”  Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
133 203 U.S. 1, 14–15, 20 (1906).  One year earlier, the Court had “entertain[ed] no doubt” 
about Congress’s power under Section 2 to ban peonage, “defined as a status or condi-
tion of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.”  
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 208, 215, 218 (1905) (upholding the Peonage Act of 
1867, then codified at sections 1990 and 5526 of the Revised Code and now codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1994 and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006)). 
134 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 18 (“[N]o mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation operates 
to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery.”).  This view prevailed on the Court un-
til Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 n.87 (1968), overruled Hodges.  See, e.g., 
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction in case 
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Justice Harlan again dissented, reiterating that under Section 2, 
“Congress may not only prevent the reestablishing of the institution 
of slavery, pure and simple, but may make it impossible that any of its 
incidents or badges should exist or be enforced in any State or Terri-
tory of the United States.”135 
The limited view of Hodges did not stop civil rights advocates and 
commentators from continuing to invoke the concept of the badges 
of slavery.  Newspaper articles from roughly the first half of the twen-
tieth century reveal that the phrase was often used to refer to Jim 
Crow laws and other official forms of segregation.136  Indeed, at least 
one widely regarded political commentator, Walter Lippmann, sug-
gested that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would justify the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it attacked “[s]egregation in public 
places” which was a “badge of slavery.”137 
By 1968, the meaning of “badge of slavery” evolved even further, 
encompassing widespread privately enforced housing discrimination.  
That year, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court over-
ruled Hodges and vitiated the Civil Rights Cases’ narrow understanding 
of the badges and incidents of slavery.138  After a private property de-
veloper refused to sell a home to an interracial couple, the question 
arose whether the property conveyance provision of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982, prohibited racial discrimi-
 
where defense claimed that enforcement of racially restrictive covenant would violate Sec-
tion 1 the Thirteenth Amendment because the Amendment reaches only “condition[s] 
of enforced compulsory service of one to another, [and] does not in other matters pro-
tect the individual rights of persons of the negro race”). 
135 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 27. 
136 See, e.g., Cobb Ridicules Specious “Gag” of Race Hater, CHI. DEFENDER, July 1, 1922, at 8 (quot-
ing NAACP attorney as stating that “[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens on a basis of 
race at a public celebration is a badge of servitude”); Benjamin E. Mays, Segregation as Law 
Resulted in Lynching’s Establishment as a Southern Practice, PITTSBURGH COURIER, July 8, 1950 
(quoting book author as stating that “the courts have held that . . . the Constitu-
tion . . . . has not outlawed the badges of slavery, such as jim crowism”); Negroes See Coer-
cion:  Tallahassee Accused in Case Against 21 in Car Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1956, at 44 
(quoting civil rights attorney as describing racial segregation in city buses as “nothing 
more than a badge of servitude”); Supreme Court Debate:  Is Segregation Unlawful?  High Court 
Hears Five School Suits, PITTSBURGH COURIER, Dec. 13, 1952, at 1, 4 (recounting Thurgood 
Marshall’s oral argument in Brown v. Board of Education where he argued that segregated 
education “perpetuates the badge of slavery for Negro children”); see also United States v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 867–68 (5th Cir. 1966) (terming segregated 
schools a badge of slavery). 
137 Walter Lippmann, Editorial, Segregation Is Badge of Slavery:  Civil Rights Bill Bound to Pass, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1963, at 16 (“Segregation in public places is a badge of slavery and 
servitude, and the obligation and the power of Congress to erase the badge derives from 
the decision to abolish slavery.”). 
138 392 U.S. 409, 443 n.78 (1968). 
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nation by private sellers.  Concluding that it did, 139 the Court then 
turned to the question whether it was within Congress’s power to 
enact such a prohibition:  “[D]oes the authority of Congress to en-
force the Thirteenth Amendment ‘by appropriate legislation’ include 
the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and 
personal property?”140  In the Court’s view, “the answer to that ques-
tion . . . [was] plainly yes.”141 
Citing the Civil Rights Cases, the Court found it “clear that the 
Enabling Clause of . . . [the Thirteenth] Amendment . . . clothed 
‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing 
all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States,’”142 including “the 
sort of positive legislation that was embodied in the 1866 Act.”143  In a 
footnote, the Court added that Section 2 empowered Congress “to 
eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half 
free.”144  Rather than define the “badges,” “incidents,” and “vestiges” 
of slavery, the Court stated that “Congress has the pow-
er . . . rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents 
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into ef-
fective legislation.”145  The Court then endorsed as rational Congress’s 
finding that the property developer’s racial discrimination was a 
badge and incident of slavery, noting the historical link between the 
race-based denial of property rights and slavery:  “Just as the Black 
Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise 
of . . . [civil] rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclu-
sion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for the 
Black Codes.”146  The Court concluded that “when racial discrimina-
 
139 Id. at 420–37.  Justice Harlan filed a strong dissent on this question, arguing that the ma-
jority’s “construction of § 1982 as applying to purely private action is almost surely wrong 
and, at the least, is open to serious doubt.”  Id. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. at 439. 
141 Id.  Although the focus of Justice Harlan’s dissent was the statutory construction issue, he 
noted briefly that the Court’s ruling on Congress’s constitutional authority to pass § 1982 
was dubious.  See id. at 476–77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
142 Id. at 439 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). 
143 Id. at 439–40.  The Court pointed specifically to statements made by Senator Lyman 
Trumbull and Representative James Wilson made in defense of the 1866 Act.  See id. at 
440 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 322 (1866)) (asserting that Section 2 
gave Congress the power to “destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the 
black man . . . .  Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be?  The Congress 
of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may 
think proper.”). 
144 Id. at 441 n.78. 
145 Id. at 440. 
146 Id. at 441–42. 
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tion herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property 
turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”147 
The Jones Court thus invoked the operative language of the Civil 
Rights Cases but added an additional gloss by indicating that Section 2 
empowers Congress to outlaw private race discrimination in housing 
because such discrimination was not only a “badge” or “incident” of 
slavery, but also a “vestige” and “relic” of slavery.148  The Jones majority 
may well have used the latter two terms in an offhand way as syn-
onyms for a badge of slavery.  Indeed, the Court did not suggest that 
the “badges and incidents” formulation was analytically inadequate, 
or comment that “vestige” and “relic” were meant to expand the sub-
jects of congressional action under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Since Jones, however, many commentators have seized upon the 
“vestige” and “relic” language in order to expand the coverage of 
Congress’s Section 2 power.  For example, Professor Lawrence Sager 
has argued that there is an important distinction between “badges 
and incidents of slavery”—which are the “contemporary attributes” of 
slavery—and the “relics of slavery”—which are “deeply ingrained, en-
during consequences” such as the history of race discrimination.149  
There is a solid basis for these distinctions:  “vestige” and “relic” have 
different connotations than “badge.”  While “badge” refers to a physi-
cal or metaphorical indication of subordinate status,150 “relic” is de-
fined as “[s]omething that has survived the passage of time, especially 
an object or custom whose original culture has disappeared.”151  A 
“vestige” is a “visible trace, evidence, or sign of something that once 
existed but exists or appears no more.”152  Thus, because the latter 
terms refer to the products of history, rather than indicators of cur-
rent subordination, they cover a potentially much larger range of 
conduct and situations than do “badges” and “incidents.” 
Even though the Jones Court gave no indication that it meant for 
“relic” and “vestige” to have independent operative force, it is worth 
 
147 Id. at 442–43. 
148 Jones added a second component to the Civil Rights Cases framework by stating that Con-
gress could define for itself the meaning of the “badges and incidents of slavery,” subject 
only to rationality review in the federal courts.  For comments on the propriety of this 
approach, see McAward, supra note 15, at 135–41. 
149 See Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in 
Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 152 (2000) (arguing that Jones’ explanation 
of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power provides a template for understand-
ing how the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power might justify the Violence 
Against Women Act). 
150 See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text. 
151 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). 
152 Id. 
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examining their usage prior to Jones in order to evaluate the potential 
impact of their inclusion in the Section 2 analysis.  Both were used in 
popular commentary, political debates, and—to a much lesser ex-
tent—judicial decisions.  From the Reconstruction Era through the 
time of Jones, “relic of slavery” was used to reference discriminatory 
public laws and government practices.153  For example, laws that pro-
hibited interracial marriages or limited the availability of marriage 
between African Americans, were denounced as relics of slavery,154 as 
were laws barring in-court testimony by African Americans,155 permit-
ting punishment by whipping post,156 and mandating segregation.157  
Both before the Civil War and through the turn of the century, the 
term “vestige of slavery” generally was used by abolitionists and politi-
cians but not the popular press.  In the vast majority of uses, the 
phrase had no particularized meaning but rather referred in general 
to the eradication of slavery.158  On rare occasion, the abolitionist 
press used “vestige of slavery” to refer to racially discriminatory public 
laws.159  One member of Congress argued that the Civil Rights Act of 
 
153 In addition to the examples below, one member of the House of Representatives applied 
the term to proposed legislation that would have required Chinese laborers to register 
and carry a passport within the United States.  See 13 CONG. REC. 2183 (1882) (statement 
of Rep. Dawes).  Also, there are a handful of instances in which private race discrimina-
tion was called a “relic of slavery.”  See, e.g., SOUTHWESTERN CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE (New 
Orleans), Aug. 10, 1882, at col. F (describing an inn’s refusal to serve an African Ameri-
can clergyman as a “reli[c] of slavery in its ghostly form”). 
154 See Editorial, Editorial Notes, N.Y. FREEMAN, Mar. 5, 1887, at col. C (discussing interracial 
marriage); At Home and Abroad, 54 FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (New York), 
June 10, 1882, at 247 (describing marriage between African Americans). 
155 See Editorial Bulletin, The Negro Testimony Bill, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San Francisco), Mar. 
24, 1862, at col. A (lauding repeal of bill barring testimony by African Americans against 
whites, and commenting that people are “hostile to slavery and its relics”). 
156 See Whipping in Virginia:  Exercise of the Worst Relic of Barbarism and Slavery—Two Negroes Re-
ceive Twenty Stripes Each—Stoical Indifference of the Offenders—An Ex-Hangman Applies the 
Lash, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 22, 1872, at col. E. 
157 T.E. Mattingly, Letter to the Editor, Relic of Slavery, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1953, at 12 (“Se-
gregation in the Nation’s Capital is a denial that all the relics of human slavery have been 
legally abolished.”); Publisher Itemizes His Opposition to School Bias, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, 
July 14, 1953, at 2 (“I am against racial segregation because:  It is a relic of slavery.”).  
Notably, the same author referred to segregation as “[a] badge of servitude.”  Id. 
158 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 155 (1865) (statement of Rep. Davis) (stat-
ing that the path to legal equality for the freed slaves depended on “removing every ves-
tige of African slavery from the American Republic”); CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS. 1324 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment 
would “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, 
and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit”). 
159 Middlesex County Latimer Committee, LIBERATOR (Boston) 1843, at 3 (calling anti-
miscegenation laws “the last legal vestige of slavery”); George B. Vashon, Editorial, N. 
STAR (Rochester), Jan. 28, 1848, at 2 (calling school segregation in Massachusetts the “last 
vestige of slavery”). 
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1866 would “ri[d] the country of every vestige of slavery, in form and 
in fact.”160 
After the turn of the century, however, both terms obtained addi-
tional layers of meaning.  Some used “relic of slavery” to refer to 
tense race relations161 and structural racial disparities, including with 
respect to literacy162 and self-confidence.163  Even more notably, start-
ing in the Civil Rights Era, the term “vestige of slavery” was used by 
civil rights advocates to refer to all types of racial discrimination, pub-
lic and private, and to link the condition of modern African Ameri-
cans with historical slavery.  For example, in a 1953 speech to the Na-
tional Urban League Convention, Thurgood Marshall (then-Special 
Counsel to the NAACP) called for “the abolition of the vestiges of sla-
very,” which, he said, are “second-class citizenship, threat of physical 
violence, residential segregation, and denial of the right of employ-
ment.”164 
There were only two significant judicial uses of “relic of slavery”—
and none of “vestige”165—prior to Jones.  Although neither case fo-
cused on the question of congressional enforcement of the Thir-
teenth Amendment,166 both cases articulated concern over racial dis-
 
160 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 56 (1866) (statement of Rep. Julian). 
161 See Southerners May Support Mitchell’s Bill as “The Lesser of Two Evils;” Other Bills Appear Too 
Drastic, PLAINDEALER (Kansas City), Apr. 9, 1937, at 1 (quoting Rep. Arthur Mitchell, 
speaking in support of a new federal lynching law, as saying that “most of the lynchings 
have taken place in the South where the Negro is struggling against the bitterness which 
is a relic of slavery and the Reconstruction period”). 
162 See Editorial, Mr. Gorman’s Boomerang, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 9, 1901, at 6 (calling black 
illiteracy “a relic of slavery”). 
163 T. Nelson Baker, Editorial, A Negro’s View of the Race Problem, 88 CONGREGATIONALIST & 
CHRISTIAN WORLD (Boston), May 30, 1903, at 763 (“As a relic of slavery there is an inborn 
feeling in both the white and the colored child that the latter is inferior.”). 
164 Jack Saunders, Segregation Hit by 1,000 at Urban League Convention, PITTSBURGH COURIER, 
Sept. 19, 1953, at 31; see also E.W. Kenworthy, Rights Bill:  The Arguments in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1963, at 10E (noting that Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified be-
fore Congress that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was justified by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment “because discrimination is a ‘vestige of slavery’”); Emanuel Perlmutter, Warren and 
Young Warn of Effects of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1969, at 56 (quoting speech given 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren after his retirement from the Supreme Court in which he 
called for “a massive assault upon our urban problems, free from racial prejudice and 
from the vestiges of slavery”). 
165 The only possible notable use is Edwards v. Habib, in which the court stated that “the Re-
construction amendments were enacted . . . to eradicate forever the vestiges of slavery 
and the black codes.” 397 F.2d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968).  This might suggest that the 
“vestiges of slavery” was a category that included more than just the Black Codes and simi-
lar public laws, but without further commentary it is impossible to draw a clear conclu-
sion. 
166 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education did state that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was “appropriate and proper legislation under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
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crimination resulting in African Americans’ “second-class citizen-
ship,” and equated a “relic of slavery” with a “badge of slavery.”167  
Concurring in Bell v. Maryland,168 a case dealing with a “sit-in” protest 
that resulted in criminal trespass charges, Justice Douglas stated:  
“Segregation of Negroes in the restaurants and lunch counters of 
parts of America is a relic of slavery.  It is a badge of second-class citi-
zenship.”169  He went on to note other relics of slavery, including ra-
cial discrimination against court witnesses and segregation in schools, 
courtrooms, and public parks.170  In United States v. Jefferson County 
Board of Education,171 Judge John Minor Wisdom upheld several school 
districts’ desegregation plans, asserting that state governments have 
an affirmative duty to “eradicate all relics, ‘badges and indicia of sla-
very’ lest Negroes as a race sink back into ‘second-class’ citizenship.”172  
Thus, at the time of Jones, the concepts of the “relics” and “vestig-
es” of slavery had evolved from covering discriminatory state laws to 
including widespread public and private racial discrimination as well.  
Unlike the concept of “badges and incidents” articulated by the Soli-
citor General in the Civil Rights Cases, though, there appears to be no 
overt causal element in the concept of “relics and vestiges.”  As dis-
cussed above, the former covers conduct that could potentially cause 
the reinvigoration or reimposition of a de facto slave system.  The 
concept of “relics” and “vestiges” does not require such a causal link.  
Rather, it is a consequential concept that covers conduct that argua-
bly is the product of slavery but does not necessarily point to its re-
 
ments,” but did not link the concept of a “relic of slavery” to congressional enforcement 
legislation.  372 F.2d 836, 856 (5th Cir. 1966). 
167 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 260 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Segregation of 
Negroes . . . is a relic of slavery.  It is a badge of second-class citizenship.”); Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 873 (arguing that “relics, ‘badges and indicia of slavery’” may 
cause African-Americans to “sink back into ‘second-class’ citizenship” (citation omitted)). 
168 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
169 Id. at 260 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 247–48 (“The Black Codes were a substi-
tute for slavery; segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes; . . . [and segregation in 
restaurants] is a relic of slavery.”). 
170 Id. at 248 n.4.  Along these same lines, Justice Douglas concurred in Jones, noting that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 took aim at “some” of the badges of slavery but others persisted 
into modern times.  Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445–46 (1968) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (listing state and private actions).  He catalogued the “spectacle of slavery 
unwilling to die,” including state actions, such as laws designed to keep African Ameri-
cans from voting and from jury service, anti-miscegenation laws, segregation in cour-
trooms and schools, and segregation in public facilities.  Id. at 445.  He also included pri-
vate actions, including refusals to sell or rent property to African Americans, to provide 
service in restaurants and motels, and to admit African Americans to labor unions.  Id. at 
447–48. 
171 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
172 Id. at 873 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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turn.  Accordingly, characterizing Congress’s power as extending to 
the “vestiges” and “relics” of slavery could substantially broaden the 
reach of federal power to cover any act of injustice that could be tied 
in some way—however attenuated—to the system of slavery.  This 
would be a significant departure from the concept of “badges and in-
cidents” as developed prior to Jones. 
The question, then, is whether the concept of “relics” or “vestiges” 
of slavery should be privileged over that of the “badges and incidents 
of slavery” for purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment analysis.  I 
suggest that the answer is no.  First, the language of “relics” and “ves-
tiges” lacks historical pedigree in the Thirteenth Amendment context 
when compared to the language of “badges and incidents.”  Indeed, 
the latter has been described as “canonical in interpreting the [Thir-
teenth] [A]mendment.”173  Second, there is nothing in Jones that sug-
gests that the Court’s references to relics and vestiges was analytically 
significant or designed to expand the appropriate subjects of Thir-
teenth Amendment enforcement legislation beyond that permitted 
by the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery.  Indeed, the 
Jones Court cited the language of the Civil Rights Cases with approval 
and its analysis suggested that it viewed the terms as synonymous.  Fi-
nally, though, my concern about extending the Section 2 power to 
cover the relics and vestiges of slavery boils down to the absence of a 
causal element in that concept.  I discuss the importance of this ele-
ment in greater detail in Part III.C.  For now, suffice it to say that I 
regard the Jones Court’s references to relics and vestiges as an inter-
esting but ultimately unwarranted diversion from the task of identify-
ing the proper subjects of congressional legislation in the Thirteenth 
Amendment context. 
II. POST-JONES LITIGATION AND SCHOLARSHIP REGARDING THE 
MEANING OF THE “BADGES AND INCIDENTS OF SLAVERY” 
Since Jones, litigants and scholars alike have invoked Congress’s 
power over the “badges and incidents of slavery” (as well as slavery’s 
relics and vestiges) as a novel constitutional argument against various 
forms of injustice.174  Most have focused on race-based discrimination, 
 
173 Rutherglen, supra note 63, at 172. 
174 Congress generally has not responded to these suggestions.  It has passed only a limited 
amount of Thirteenth Amendment legislation in the modern era.  See, e.g., supra notes 
12–13 and accompanying text. 
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including hate crimes,175 hate speech,176 racial profiling,177 employ-
ment discrimination,178 criminal sentencing disparities,179 and race-
based peremptory challenges.180  However, many have gone beyond 
race, claiming that everything from municipal lawn mowing ordin-
ances,181 to sealed adoption records,182 to human cloning,183 to restric-
tions on reproductive rights,184 to sex discrimination185 and harass-
ment,186 to discrimination against gay people187 are badges and 
 
175 See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 189 (2d Cir. 2002) (“It is important to under-
stand that acts of violence or force committed against members of a hated class of people 
with the intent to exact retribution for and create dissuasion against their use of public 
facilities have a long and intimate historical association with slavery and its cognate insti-
tutions.”); Jason A. Abel, Americans Under Attack:  The Need for Federal Hate Crime Legislation 
in Light of Post-September 11 Attacks on Arab Americans and Muslims, 12 ASIAN L.J. 41, 43 
(2005) (“I argue that the proper response to these hate crimes, or any hate crime, for 
that matter, should be to expand current federal hate crime legislation, specifically with 
the enactment of the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act (LLEEA).”). 
176 See Amar, supra note 20, at 126 (discussing the “centrality of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments in the hate-speech debate”); Petal Nevella Modeste, Race Hate Speech:  The Pervasive 
Badge of Slavery That Mocks the Thirteenth Amendment, 44 HOW. L.J. 311, 312 (2001) (“While 
other authors have suggested that tort remedies be established for injuries suffered as a 
result of racist words, this article maintains that the only way to protect victims of race 
hate speech from its ill effects is to criminalize its dissemination altogether.”). 
177 See Carter, supra note 21, at 19 (“This Article contends that the Thirteenth Amendment, 
in contrast to the equal protection paradigm that is currently the focus of racial profiling 
jurisprudence and scholarship, provides a stronger constitutional basis for combating this 
lingering vestige of slavery.”). 
178 See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing alleged ra-
cially discriminatory policies in the selection, training, and promotion of New Orleans 
police officers). 
179 See Colbert, supra note 22, at 38–49 (discussing, in part, the importance of race in capital 
sentencing decisions). 
180 See id. at 38–43 (discussing prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges as weapons for 
striking prospective African Americans from juries); Colbert, supra note 16. 
181 See Rowe v. City of Elyria, 38 Fed. Appx. 277, 283 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing the plain-
tiff’s argument that “forcing him to mow the grass . . . may be fairly characterized as a 
‘badge or incident of slavery’”). 
182 See Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing whether adult 
adoptees are constitutionally entitled to obtain their sealed adoption records). 
183 See Sean Charles Vinck, Note, Does the Thirteenth Amendment Provide a Jurisdictional Basis for 
a Federal Ban on Cloning?, 30 J. LEGIS. 183, 183 (2003) (“Because of cloning’s potential to 
impose ‘badges and incidents’ of slavery on cloned persons, the Thirteenth Amendment 
is a plausible source of authority for a ban on human cloning.”). 
184 See Bridgewater, supra note 25, at 409–10 (tracing restrictions on women’s reproductive 
freedom to the reproductive abuse of female slaves during the antebellum period). 
185 See Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments:  Constitutional Authority for 
Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 323–24 (1977) 
(arguing that Congress has authority pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate 
against private sex discrimination). 
186 See Conn, supra note 24, at 519 (suggesting that Congress may legislate against sexually 
harassing speech by invoking its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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incidents of slavery.  Few, however, have engaged in any systematic 
analysis regarding precisely what a badge or incident of slavery is.  
Generally, one of two assumptions is at the heart of most invocations 
of the concept.  First, those who focus on race discrimination often 
assume that any modern analogue of historical bias against African-
Americans is a badge or incident of slavery.  Second, those who take a 
broader view of the permissible subjects of regulation generally as-
sume that any type of class-based oppression is a badge or incident of 
slavery because slavery itself was a system of class-based oppression.  
Both approaches are distinctly different from the “causal” approach 
articulated in the Solicitor General’s brief in the Civil Rights Cases. 
The “historical link” view of the badges and incidents of slavery 
originated in Jones itself, where the Court tied “the exclusion of Ne-
groes from white communities” to “the Black Codes” to “the slave sys-
tem” itself.188  Judge A. Leon Higginbotham utilized this same mode 
of analysis in Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, a case which alleged 
that union members had harassed and intimidated African Ameri-
cans who had sued the union for race discrimination.189  After finding 
that several statutes empowered the court to enjoin the harassment,190 
he held that those statutes were valid under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment: 
“What does the beating of black litigants in this case have to do with the 
‘badges and incidents’ of slavery?  How can the attitudes of defendants 
be related to the institution of slavery which was eradicated more than 
100 years ago?”  The answer is that these racist acts are as related to the 
incidents of slavery as each roar of the ocean is related to each incoming 
wave.  For slavery was an institution which was sanctioned, sustained, encour-
aged and perpetuated by federal constitutional doctrine.  Today’s conditions on 
race relations are a sequelae and consequence of the pathology created by this na-
tion’s two and a half centuries of slavery.191 
 
187 See Courtman, supra note 26, at 328 (suggesting that the inability of homosexuals to enter 
into a marriage contract is akin to slave’s inability to contract and is thus a “badge and in-
cident of slavery”); Tedhams, supra note 17, at 134 (arguing that laws that stigmatize ho-
mosexuals create “badges of slavery”). 
188 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–42 (1968) (“Just as the Black Codes, 
enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for 
the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute 
for the Black Codes.”). 
189 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
190 He found that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3) all provided jurisdiction.  See id. at 
284–85. 
191 Id. at 299; see also R.I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Kreps, 450 F. 
Supp. 338, 361 (D.R.I. 1978) (stating that, despite a color-blind ideal, Congress continues 
to have power to protect African Americans specifically by “eradicat[ing] the vestiges of 
slavery, its badges and incidents” because “current ‘racist acts are as related to the inci-
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Higginbotham detailed the rights denied to African Americans 
(slave and free) before the Civil War, including access to federal 
court, labor rights, liberty, equality, justice, human dignity, and family 
integrity.192  Using Jones as a baseline, he concluded that if the Thir-
teenth Amendment permitted Congress to ensure equal access to 
housing, it would also permit Congress to ensure equal access to the 
courts and to employment opportunities.193  Thus, in Judge Higginbo-
tham’s view, a badge and incident of slavery for Thirteenth Amend-
ment purposes was any public or private discriminatory conduct 
aimed at African Americans, because all such discrimination is a “se-
quelae and consequence” of slavery.194 
Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit articulated a simi-
lar view in Williams v. City of New Orleans.195  The plurality in that case 
disapproved a consent decree that included a promotions quota de-
signed to remedy years of racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices in the New Orleans Police Department.196  Judge Wisdom con-
curred and dissented in part, asserting that Title VII permitted 
affirmative action efforts on behalf of African Americans, and that, so 
read, Title VII was validly enacted under Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.197  He stated that a badge of slavery 
or inferiority occurs whenever a “present discriminatory effect upon 
blacks as a class can be linked with a discriminatory practice against 
blacks as a race under the slavery system.”198  In other words, “all prac-
tices that continue[] to label blacks as inferior because of their race” 
are badges of slavery as long as the practice is “historically linked with 
 
dents of slavery as each roar of the ocean is related to each oncoming wave’” (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1972))). 
192 See Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. at 299–300.   
193 See id. at 301. 
194 Id. at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
195 729 F.2d 1554, 1570 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 509–10 (1980) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (arguing that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress 
to pass minority set-aside).  Cf. Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400–02 
(1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (detailing the history and legacy of slavery and legal in-
equality for African Americans and concluding that current inequalities result “not mere-
ly [from] the history of slavery alone, but also [from the fact] that a whole people were 
marked as inferior by the law.  And that mark has endured.  The dream of America as the 
great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color, he never 
even made it into the pot”). 
196 See Williams, 729 F.2d at 1562–64 (plurality opinion). 
197 See id. at 1574–78 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
198 Id. at 1577. 
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slavery or involuntary servitude.”199  Discrimination against African-
American officers in the New Orleans Police Department was inti-
mately linked with slavery, which at its core involved the “race-based 
denial of equal economic opportunities,”200 as well as post-
Reconstruction prejudice.  “The under-representation of blacks on 
the force since 1898, or perhaps since 1874–77, is a badge of slavery:  
it is a sign, readily visible in the community, that attaches a stigma 
upon the black race.”201 
Thus, in the view of both Judges Higginbotham and Wisdom, for 
conduct to constitute a badge of slavery, it must (1) target African 
Americans as a class, (2) in a way that labels them inferior, and (3) is 
historically linked to slavery and its aftermath.  While there is a causal 
element to their analysis, that the conduct must stigmatize, the pri-
mary focus is on the historical link to slavery.  Although neither jurist 
used the language of “relics” or “vestiges,” their emphasis on the leg-
acy of slavery rather than the consequences of the current conduct 
indicates thinking more in line with a “relics and vestiges” approach 
to the Section 2 power.202 
Other scholars and judges have utilized a similar approach, ar-
guing for Thirteenth Amendment coverage of modern forms of race 
discrimination and harassment where it is possible to analogize that 
conduct to an aspect of slavery.  For example, Professor Douglas L. 
Colbert has suggested that racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices, peremptory challenges, and capital punishment sentencing 
practices can all be viewed as badges of slavery because there is a his-
torical link between slavery and these current disparities.203  Professor 
Akhil Reed Amar has argued that Congress could criminalize burning 
a cross on the lawn of an African-American family because such “in-
 
199 Id. at 1578–79.  Judge Wisdom had asserted in a 1966 decision that segregated schools 
placed a badge of slavery upon African-American children.  See United States v. Jefferson 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 873 (5th Cir. 1966). 
200 Williams, 729 F.2d at 1579–80 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
201 Id. at 1580; see also id. at 1572–73 (“Under the thirteenth amendment, the Constitution 
contemplates, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not 
prohibit, race-conscious, class-based, prospective relief . . . . [in a case] in which discrimi-
nation in a state governmental unit is system-wide, institutional, and the product of a long 
history of discrimination against blacks as a group to continue what amounts to a caste 
system.”). 
202 See supra notes 149–72 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of “relics” and “ves-
tiges” of slavery). 
203 See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 16, at 32–54 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment’s legis-
lative history points to the Amendment’s purpose as uprooting and destroying slavery).  
Professor Alexander Tsesis has stated that the analysis of whether particular conduct con-
stitutes a badge or incident of slavery requires “compar[ing] contemporary harms to past 
practices.”  TSESIS, supra note 34, at 118. 
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tentional trapping of a captive audience of blacks, in order to subject 
them to face-to-face degradation and dehumanization on the basis of 
their race” is “temporary involuntary servitude, a sliver of slavery.”204  
And Judge Guido Calabresi has argued that the act of injuring any 
person “because of his race, color, religion or national origin” and 
“because he is . . . enjoying any [state-administered] bene-
fit . . . program [or] facility”205 is a badge of slavery because “there ex-
ist indubitable connections . . . between slavery and private violence 
directed against despised and enslaved groups . . . [and] between 
post Civil War efforts to return freed slaves to a subjugated status and 
private violence directed at interfering with and discouraging the 
freed slaves’ exercise of civil rights in public places.”206 
More recently, Professor William Carter, Jr., has articulated a 
slightly more nuanced, historically based framework for understand-
ing the badges and incidents of slavery.207  Carter asserts that a badge 
of slavery is any public or private act of “discrimination and subordi-
nation” aimed at African Americans, which “provided essential legal 
and societal support for slavery and . . . [was] also part of de jure and 
de facto attempts to return the freedmen to a condition of servitude 
and sub-humanity after formal emancipation.”208  Examples of con-
duct that invokes the “stigma of blackness” and thus constitutes a 
badge of slavery include peremptory jury challenges against African 
Americans, racial profiling, hate crimes, housing discrimination, in-
equality in the administration of criminal and civil justice, and syste-
 
204 Amar, supra note 20, at 158 & n.183.  Amar acknowledges, however, that “[m]ore histori-
cal research . . . is needed to trace the usage of [the “badge of slavery”] among abolition-
ists, freedmen, and Reconstruction Republicans.  Perhaps the phrase had some narrow 
and precise meaning wholly irrelevant to private racist oppression . . . .”  Id. at 156 n.175. 
205 This conduct is criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
206 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 190 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding the conviction of 
two African American men under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) for killing an orthodox Jew-
ish man as he walked down a city sidewalk).  Writing for the majority, Judge Calabresi 
stated that badges of slavery were not just race-based actions, but that interfering with a 
person’s use of a public facility because of his religion is also a badge of slavery because 
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment protects all persons from slavery without regard 
to race or membership in any other class.  Id. at 179–80.  Judge Calabresi’s analysis does 
not address the question of whether the category of those whom Congress can protect 
from the “badges and incidents of slavery” under Section 2 is coextensive with the catego-
ry of those whom the judiciary can protect from “slavery and involuntary servitude” under 
Section 1. 
207 See Carter, supra note 34, at 1317 (criticizing current approaches to “construing the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s self-executing prohibition of the badges and incidents of sla-
very . . . [as] misguided”). 
208 Id. at 1367–68 (giving examples of race-based conduct that “either existed in the same 
form during slavery or is closely analogous thereto”). 
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matic denial of equal education opportunities.209  Carter also asserts 
that non-racial classes can be subject to the badges and incidents of 
slavery, where the injury or discrimination is “closely tied to the struc-
tures supporting or created by the system of slavery” and manifests 
“fear [and] group stigma . . . in law and custom.”210  Carter provides 
the examples of religiously motivated hate crimes and racial profiling 
of Arabs and Muslims.211 
Carter’s approach, while primarily historical in nature, puts an in-
teresting twist on the causal element developed in the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s Civil Rights Cases brief.  For Carter, if the conduct in question 
historically was part of the effort to reestablish a de facto slave system 
in the South, it is a badge of slavery regardless of whether it continues 
to pose that risk today.212  Thus, he folds causation into the historical 
inquiry rather than treating it as a separate element to be evaluated 
currently. 
The most expansive conceptualization of the “badges and inci-
dents of slavery” has been proffered by Professor G. Sidney Bucha-
nan.  Buchanan regards a “chief vice of the institution of slavery []as 
its arbitrary irrationality, which effected a concomitant denigration of 
human dignity.”213  Thus, he asserts that “any act motivated by arbi-
trary class prejudice . . . . which, in its cumulative manifestations, has 
assumed a pattern of regional significance”214 imposes “a badge of sla-
very upon its victim.”215  Racial prejudice—public or private—is the 
paradigm of conduct Congress may address under the Thirteenth 
Amendment because such prejudice (1) was at the core of slavery,216 
(2) “has assumed a pattern of regional significance . . . in the histori-
cal experience of American society,”217 and (3) “clog[s] the channels 
of opportunity”218 and “places a heavy toll on the human spirit.”219 
According to Buchanan, however, racial discrimination is not the 
only conduct that imposes a badge of slavery.  Rather, drawing from 
classes protected by civil rights laws and equal protection jurispru-
 
209 See id. at 1368, 1376. 
210 Id. at 1317–18, 1369. 
211 Id. at 1369–74. 
212 Notably, the second portion of Carter’s theory of the badges and incidents of slavery con-
tinues to seek a historical link to slavery, but contains no causal element.  Id. at 1371–74. 
213 G. Sydney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom:  A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
HOW. L. REV. 1070, 1073 (1975). 
214 Id. at 1072, 1077. 
215 Id. at 1072. 
216 See id. at 1073. 
217 Id. at 1077. 
218 Id. at 1078. 
219 Id. 
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dence, Buchanan argues that discrimination or tortious conduct 
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and alienage, and 
perhaps even age, handicap, criminal history, hippie lifestyle, and po-
litical association constitutes a badge of slavery.220  “[T]here is nothing 
in the nature of the trait upon which a given act of discrimination is 
based that limits congressional power under § 2 of the thirteenth 
amendment.”221  Rather, the analytical keys are whether the “preju-
dice is arbitrary and has assumed a pattern of regional signific-
ance.”222 
Thus, neither the identity of the victim nor a specific historical 
link to the slave system is a dispositive factor for Buchanan.223  Rather, 
his focus rests primarily on arbitrary class-based oppression that mir-
rors slavery only in the most general way.224  Interestingly, though, he 
draws a distinction between isolated private conduct and private con-
duct that has “regional significance.”225  This portion of his theory, at 
least, echoes Solicitor General Phillips’ brief in the Civil Rights Cases 
which limited the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery to 
private action that “reflect[s] . . . the views of the community” and 
thus “tends to enlarge . . . a particular current in public opinion.”226  
Overall, however, Buchanan admits that his proposed framework “ac-
cord[s] generous power to Congress” to legislate broadly under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.227 
Some have specifically invoked Buchanan’s class-based oppression 
framework as the basis for arguing that specific types of bias consti-
tute badges and incidents of slavery.  For example, David Tedhams 
 
220 Id. at 1084.  One note presaged Buchanan’s approach.  See Note, Jones v. Mayer:  The 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 
1026 (1969) (suggesting that “badges and incidents” could be construed to protect “all 
minority groups . . . suffering today under conditions that could reasonably be called 
symptoms of a slave society, inability to raise a family with dignity caused by unemploy-
ment, poor schools and housing, and lack of a place in the body politic”). 
221 See Buchanan, supra note 213, at 1084. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. at 1073 (noting that there is a “palpable . . . historical link” between slavery and 
modern acts motivated by arbitrary prejudice). 
224 Carter has criticized Buchanan’s approach as untethered from Thirteenth Amendment 
history.  See Carter, supra note 34, at 1364–65. 
225 See Buchanan, supra note 213, at 1078 (excluding from the concept of badges and inci-
dents of slavery prejudice that is “manifested only in random and isolated behavior” and 
does not “pervasively foreclose[]” the target “from realizing his human potential”). 
226 Brief for the United States, supra note 115, at 24. 
227 See Buchanan, supra note 17, at 1085.  He claims that “countervailing constitutional post-
ulates” can limit Congress from using its Thirteenth Amendment power to “penetrat[e] 
too deeply into the inner circle of associational choice,” but admits that they are unlikely 
to do so.  Id. 
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cited Buchanan in arguing that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which 
prohibited gay people from bringing discrimination claims, “stigma-
tizes [gays] with a badge of inferiority . . . [in violation of] the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s spirit of equality.”228 
Others have utilized a hybrid historical/class-based oppression 
framework, arguing that the badge of slavery concept covers any form 
of modern-day oppression as long as the oppression echoes a slavery-
specific practice in some way.  Some have linked the sexual abuse of 
female slaves to current issues regarding domestic violence and re-
productive rights.229  Others, including Professor Alexander Tsesis, 
have focused on gay marriage, asserting that because slaves were not 
permitted to marry, Congress may, under Section 2, provide a “feder-
al guarantee to marry the partner of one’s choice.”230  Overall, Tsesis 
adopts a broad view of the Section 2 power, arguing that to allow 
Congress to “end any remaining vestiges of servitude and their con-
comitant forms of subordination”231 by passing “positive legislation 
that furthers people’s ability to enjoy their lives.”232 
Ultimately, in my view, neither the “historical link” nor “class-
based oppression” models fully express the proper scope of the con-
cept of the badges and incidents of slavery.  As Professor George Ru-
therglen—who stands alone in acknowledging any ambiguity regard-
ing the meaning of the “badges and incidents of slavery”233—has 
recognized, a thorough historical exegesis of the terms “badge” and 
“incident” is relevant to the concept’s ultimate definition.234  Also re-
levant in my view are structural constitutional principles such as sepa-
ration of powers and federalism, which provide perspective on the 
precise function of Section 2 legislation aimed at the badges and in-
cidents of slavery.  The next Part grapples with these historical and 
 
228 Tedhams, supra note 17, at 149–51, 165. 
229 See, e.g., Bridgewater, supra note 25, at 410–11, 423 (arguing that government-mandated 
Norplant use was akin to sexual abuse of female slaves and thus a “relic of slavery”); 
Hearn, supra note 23, at 1144 (“[M]odern violence against women is a badge and inci-
dent of nineteenth-century slavery . . . involv[ing] reduced citizenship rights”); see also 
TSESIS, supra note 34, at 124 (discussing alternative rationale for Griswold v. Connecticut 
and arguing that “laws and practices intrusive of marital autonomy [such as laws barring 
married couples’ use of contraceptives] . . . resemble the coercion of involuntary servi-
tude”). 
230 TSESIS, supra note 34, at 121; see also Courtman, supra note 26, at 328 (likening the legal 
incompetence of gays to marry to slavery’s restrictions on contract rights). 
231 TSESIS, supra note 34, at 116. 
232 Id. at 114. 
233 See Rutherglen, supra note 63, at 177 (noting that the term is ambiguous and can be criti-
cized as having “uncertain meaning, and unprincipled application” or lauded as a basis 
for “racial equality and federal civil rights legislation”). 
234 Id. at 164. 
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structural principles in an attempt to provide a framework for under-
standing the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 
III.  CONCEPTUALIZING THE “BADGES AND INCIDENTS OF SLAVERY” 
What, then, are the “badges and incidents” of slavery that Con-
gress can outlaw under the Thirteenth Amendment?  The Jones Court 
left it to Congress to define the concept itself.  However, it is possi-
ble—and, indeed, necessary—to derive a principled definition that 
will advance the purposes of the amendment itself while at the same 
time delineating the outer boundaries of the Section 2 power and 
providing judicially enforceable limits on this aspect of Congress’s 
power.  Deriving this principled definition will require a response to 
three subsidiary issues:  Whom can Congress protect?  Whose con-
duct can Congress govern?  And what conduct can Congress target? 
Before turning to these issues, however, it is important to clarify 
the premise which undergirds the following discussion—one that I 
have explored in much greater depth elsewhere:235  that Congress’s 
Section 2 power to address the badges and incidents of slavery is 
prophylactic in nature.  In other words, Section 2 permits Congress to 
pass “pure” enforcement legislation that remedies actual violations of 
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment (i.e., enslavement and invo-
luntary servitude) as well as “prophylactic” legislation that targets 
otherwise constitutional conduct in order to deter violations of Sec-
tion 1.  Legislation that targets the badges and incidents of slavery is 
of the latter type:  although the prohibited conduct may not violate 
Section 1 itself, Congress may address it in order to prevent any cu-
mulative effect that poses a real risk of the reimposition of slavery and 
involuntary servitude. 
The prophylactic reading of Section 2, particularly as compared to 
the view that would limit Congress to passing “pure” enforcement leg-
islation, permits Congress to be proactive in ensuring the permanent 
demise of slavery.  At the same time, the prophylactic view is more li-
mited than that endorsed by the Jones majority.  Rather than allow 
 
235 See McAward, supra note 15.  In this piece, I explored three possible approaches to the 
Section 2 power:  (1) that Congress can pass only ‘pure’ enforcement legislation; (2) that 
Congress can both define and eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery (i.e., the Jones 
Court’s view); and (3) that Congress can address the badges and incidents of slavery, un-
derstood as a term of art with a fixed range of meaning, as a prophylactic exercise.  Draw-
ing from the original understanding of Section 2, as well as its structural implications, I 
concluded that the final conception was the most appropriate.  See id. at 130–46.  Howev-
er, I left the task of defining the badges and incidents of slavery for another day.  See id. at 
143 n.387. 
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Congress to define for itself the badges and incidents of slavery, sub-
ject only to minimal court supervision, the prophylactic view requires 
a more concrete definition of that concept so that Congress has clear 
boundaries within which it can operate and so that courts can pro-
vide meaningful supervision of congressional action.  Because proph-
ylactic legislation is simply a means to the end of “deter[ring] or 
remed[ying]” the reimposition of slavery or involuntary servitude,236 
the definition of “the badges and incidents of slavery” is necessarily 
limited in its breadth.  Indeed, this prophylactic approach shapes the 
answers to some of the subsidiary issues I address below. 
Ultimately, I propose the following as a working definition of the 
badges and incidents of slavery that Congress may address under its 
Section 2 power:  public or widespread private conduct that targets a 
group on the basis of race or previous condition of servitude, that 
mimics the law of slavery, and that poses a substantial risk that the 
members of the targeted population will be returned to de facto sla-
very or otherwise denied the ability to participate in the basic transac-
tions of civil society. 
A.  Whom Can Congress Protect from the Badges and Incidents of Slavery? 
Most courts and scholars have assumed that Section 2 empowers 
Congress to protect all racial, and perhaps even some non-racial, 
groups.  In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the Supreme 
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protects all persons—
including white persons—from discrimination on the basis of race.237  
The Court did not address whether the Section 2 power justified such 
statutory coverage, but the Court’s holding implicitly assumed that 
discrimination against white people is a badge or incident of slavery, 
redressable under Section 2.238  Subsequent cases held that the Act 
protected all racial groups from discrimination,239 again intimating 
that Section 2 permitted Congress to address all types of racial dis-
crimination.  In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court went even 
 
236 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997). 
237 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). 
238 See Carter, supra note 34, at 1358 n.169 (“The Court in McDonald did not carefully link 
discrimination against whites to the vestiges of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment 
was designed to abolish.”). 
239 See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) (permitting claim of 
racial discrimination under § 1982 by Caucasian Jews because Jews were deemed a sepa-
rate race in 1865); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 612 (1987) (allowing 
claim of racial discrimination under § 1981 by Arab Muslim because Muslims were 
deemed a separate race in 1865). 
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further, holding that Congress acted within its Section 2 power in 
passing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which created civil liability for private 
conspiracies motivated by “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 
invidiously discriminatory animus” that seek to deprive the plaintiff 
“of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.”240 
The question of what class or classes of people Congress can pro-
tect under its Section 2 power deserves greater exploration than 
courts and commentators have given it to date.  It is true that Section 
1 of the Thirteenth Amendment protects any person from being sub-
jected to slavery or involuntary servitude,241 and that Section 2 allows 
Congress to pass laws that remedy the actual conditions of slavery and 
involuntary servitude without reference to race or any other personal 
characteristic of the victim.  However, as discussed above, this “pure” 
enforcement legislation is different from prophylactic legislation 
aimed at the “badges and incidents of slavery.”  Under this latter as-
pect of the Section 2 power, Congress may be more constrained in 
what it can do and whom it can protect, since the concept of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” is anchored to the American system 
of slavery, in which people of African descent were uniquely sub-
jected to an oppressive system of violence and coerced labor.242 
There are four possible protected categories for purposes of this 
aspect of the Section 2 power.  When a person experiences what oth-
erwise qualifies as a badge or incident of slavery, Section 2 might en-
able Congress to legislate to protect that person if she is targeted be-
cause of:  (1) her African-American race; (2) her race generally; (3) 
her previous condition or slavery or involuntary servitude in the 
United States; or (4) her membership in any discrete class of persons.  
Although there is no clearly correct answer here, I can say that I find 
Approach Four to be the least plausible theory and a combination of 
Approaches Two and Three to be the most plausible. 
Approach One finds support in both the historical and judicial 
records.  The presumed inferiority of African Americans animated 
 
240 403 U.S. 88, 102, 105 (1971).  The Second Circuit made this assumption more explicit in 
United States v. Nelson, in which it upheld a federal hate crimes law as valid Thirteenth 
Amendment legislation.  See 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding 18 U.S.C. 
§ 245(b)(2)(B)).  The court held that the Thirteenth Amendment “extends its protec-
tions to religions directly, and thus to members of the Jewish religion,” id. at 179, and that 
Congress rationally could have found crimes motivated by animus against Jews to be 
“badges and incidents of slavery,” id. at 180–81. 
241 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
242 See Carter, supra note 34, at 1365 (“The fact that the [Thirteenth] Amendment prohibits 
the actual enslavement of any person does not compel the conclusion that any person of 
any race or class can suffer a badge or incident of slavery.”). 
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the American system of chattel slavery, and every antebellum public 
use of the terms “badge” or “incident” of slavery referred specifically 
to the treatment of slaves and/or free blacks.243  The liberation of 
African American slaves was the principal goal of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and the response to the Amendment’s ratification was 
similarly focused on the status of that race.  Just as the Black Codes 
subjected the freed slaves to badges of slavery, the Civil Rights Act of 
1866—the first legislation passed pursuant to Section 2—was clearly 
designed to vitiate those codes and secure civil rights for African 
Americans.  Postbellum, every judicial discussion of “the badges and 
incidents of slavery” has referred specifically to the legal and social 
treatment of African-Americans.244  Indeed, in his LeGrand opinion, 
Justice Woods specifically stated his view that Section 2 did not em-
power Congress to legislate on behalf of white people.245 
The legislative record, however, supports Approach Two.  In the 
debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, several members of Con-
gress, including the Act’s main sponsor, clearly stated that the law was 
intended to protect all people from racial discrimination in the exer-
cise of certain civil rights, not just the freed slaves.246  Although many 
in those debates voiced doubts that Section 2 empowered Congress to 
protect civil rights at all, nobody questioned that Congress could pro-
tect people of all races in the exercise of those rights.  Indeed, this 
view of the 1866 Act’s coverage (and its implicit assumption regard-
ing the scope of the Section 2 power) has prevailed in the Supreme 
Court247 and appears to be settled precedent.248  Moreover, Congress’s 
subsequent legislative efforts to eradicate the “badges and incidents 
of slavery” generally have been aimed at discrimination on the basis 
 
243 See supra Part I.A. 
244 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–43 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 at 
25; Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 599 (1871) (Swayne, J., dissenting); United States 
v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 873 (5th Cir. 1966); Pennsylvania v. Local 
Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1972); LeGrand v. United States, 12 F. 
577, 581 (E.D. Tex. 1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (D. La. 1874), 
aff’d on other grounds, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (D. 
Ky. 1866) (Swayne, J., on circuit). 
245 See LeGrand, 12 F. at 581–82. 
246 Senator Trumbull introduced the bill and described it as applying to “every race and col-
or.” CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 211 (1866).  He later reiterated that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 would “appl[y] to white men as well as black men.”  Id. at 599; see also 
id. at 474, 504 (statement of Sen. Howard) (noting that with “respect to all civil rights . . . 
there is to be hereafter no distinction between the white race and the black race”). 
247 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
248 See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
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of race and color generally.249  This suggests that Congress itself un-
derstands this aspect of its Section 2 power as empowering it to pro-
tect people of all races from the badges and incidents of slavery.  The 
fact that judicial references to the “badges and incidents of slavery” 
have focused on the treatment of African Americans may reflect the 
reality that most inequitable treatment has centered on that particu-
lar race, but it does not necessarily circumscribe the theoretical scope 
of the Section 2 power. 
There is obvious tension between the legislative “color conscious-
ness” that Approach One would permit and the “color-blind” ap-
proach that some would require of government actors under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.250  However, this tension does not 
necessarily rule out Approach One.  As Professor Akhil Reed Amar 
has pointed out in a different context, “doctrinal rules implementing 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s basic principles must be sensitively 
crafted in light of Thirteenth Amendment principles.  Neither 
Amendment ‘trumps’ the other; rather, they must be synthesized into 
a coherent doctrinal whole.”251  Thus, if the Thirteenth Amendment 
taken on its own merits clearly permits race-conscious action on be-
half of African Americans to remediate the badges and incidents of 
slavery, then Fourteenth Amendment doctrine must accommodate 
 
249 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006) (criminalizing injuring any person “because of 
his race, color, religion or national origin” and “because he is . . . enjoying any [state-
administered] benefit . . . program [or] facility”); National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010, § 4707 (2009) (penalizing anyone who willfully injures another because 
of that person’s “actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin . . . gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity or disability”).  Of course, Congress has used its Thir-
teenth Amendment enforcement power to protect non-racial groups from slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.  See, e.g., Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006) (criminal provision) & 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (civil pro-
vision)); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1594 (2006)).  However, this “pure” 
enforcement legislation differs from enforcement legislation aimed at the “badges and 
incidents of slavery.”  See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. 
250 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A]s a general rule, all race-based government decisionmak-
ing—regardless of context—is unconstitutional.”).  Current doctrine does not absolutely 
preclude race-conscious state action.  Rather, it deems only certain justifications suffi-
ciently compelling to justify such action.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–
33 (2003) (noting that diversity can be a compelling interest in the higher education set-
ting).  However, many have critiqued the color-blind approach.  See, e.g., Parents Involved, 
551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A]s 
an aspiration, . . . [the color-blindness] axiom must command our assent.  In the real 
world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”). 
251 Amar, supra note 20, at 157 n.180. 
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those antecedent constitutional principles.252  Indeed, Approach One 
might well point to the limits of “color blindness” doctrine and pro-
vide a jurisprudential “hook” for greater flexibility in dealing with 
certain disparities facing African Americans.253 
Still, despite the potential appeal of Approach One, Approach 
Two seems to be the preferable course.  The historical, jurispruden-
tial, and legislative records all provide independent support for Ap-
proach Two.  Moreover, Approach Two recognizes that the eradica-
tion of race discrimination of any kind is a national priority.  Just as 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause by forbidding states from apportioning 
burdens and benefits on the basis of race,254 Section 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment permits Congress to ensure that neither state nor 
private actors impose the badges and incidents of slavery on members 
of any racial group.  Although there would be substantial overlap in 
the potential coverage of the two enforcement provisions, they are 
not duplicative given the broader scope of private action that Con-
gress can regulate under Section 2.255  Thus, given the historical sup-
port for Approach Two, the breadth of its coverage, and its jurispru-
dential “fit,” it would seem to be the better path in interpreting the 
scope of the Section 2 power. 
 
252 This is not to say that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power should be unders-
tood completely independent of principles developed in the Fourteenth Amendment 
context.  As I have written elsewhere, many of the principles that informed the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in City 
of Boerne v. Flores have direct relevance in the Thirteenth Amendment context.  See    
McAward, supra note 15, at 145–46. 
253 For example, one could imagine certain federal affirmative action programs finding justi-
fication under the Thirteenth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth.  One also could 
ask whether Approaches One and Two are mutually exclusive.  For example, Section 2 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment might empower Congress to protect all people from certain 
acts of race discrimination (as it did in the Civil Rights Act of 1866), and also to provide 
specific protections for African Americans (e.g., by approving an affirmative action pro-
gram).  If such an affirmative action program were subject to a Section 2 challenge, an 
analysis similar to that employed in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009), might be ap-
propriate.  In that case, the Supreme Court dealt with a clash between Title VII’s dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment provisions and found guidance in Fourteenth 
Amendment case law that “certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimina-
tion—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a 
strong basis in evidence that the remedial actions were necessary.”  Id. at 2675 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
254 See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Because racial 
classifications are presumptively invalid, most of the States’ acts of race discrimination vi-
olated the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
255 See infra Part III.B (discussing actors subject to Section 2 power). 
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Approach Three takes a different tack in identifying the popula-
tions that Congress may protect in its efforts to eradicate the badges 
and incidents of slavery.  It focuses on historical status rather than 
race, stating that Congress may protect any person or group of 
people who have been held in slavery and involuntary servitude and 
who continue to experience the badges or incidents of their former 
status.  This approach is similar to Approach One in that it would al-
low Congress to protect African Americans as a class, but not white 
people.  However, it would also permit Congress to legislate for the 
benefit of other discrete groups that have endured conditions of in-
voluntary servitude in this country, including victims of human traf-
ficking256 and immigrants in debt bondage,257 as well as those affected 
by arrangements resembling the “coolie”258 and “peonage”259 systems.  
The “badges” and “incidents” that each protected population might 
experience will differ based on that group’s unique history and cur-
rent experiences. 
On its face, this Approach would seem to be the most tailored ap-
proach to Section 2 legislation.  Although African Americans were 
uniquely subject to chattel slavery in our history, this Approach re-
cognizes that other groups have experienced conditions that violate 
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  While there may be less re-
sidual class-based discrimination against these other groups, Ap-
proach Three preserves Congress’s ability to respond should any is-
sues arise.260 
 
256 See Kevin Bales & Becky Cornell, The Next Step in the Fight Against Human Trafficking:  Out-
lawing the Trade in Slave-Made Goods, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 221 (2006) 
(explaining congressional intervention in human trafficking). 
257 See Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret Of Immigration Policy:  Under-
standing Why Congress Should Enact An Enforcement Statute For Undocumented Workers, 49 
EMORY L.J. 623, 631 (2000) (describing immigration policy decisions’ effect on undocu-
mented workers); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000)) (prohibiting sale into involuntary ser-
vitude).  The original version of the law, the Padrone Act, addressed the practice of 
bringing Italian youth to American cities and exploiting their labor.  See Rebecca E. Ziet-
low, Free at Last!  Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 291 
(2010) (discussing the Padrone Act). 
258 See Renee C. Redman, From Importation of Slaves to Migrant Laborers:  The Struggle to Outlaw 
American Participation in the Chinese Coolie Trade and the Seeds of United States Immigration 
Law, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (describing the coolie trade). 
259 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 981 (2002) (describing the peonage system). 
260 For example, victims of sex trafficking often experience abuse and emotional difficulties 
after their release, without receiving sufficient assistance from government authorities.  
See JANICE G. RAYMOND & DONNA M. HUGHES, SEX TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 87–88 (2001) (describing women’s difficulties leaving the sex industry). 
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The downside of Approach Three, however, is that it is hard to 
square with the nature of the Section 2 power.  The prophylactic as-
pect of that power is meant to permit Congress both to remedy and 
prevent violations of Section 1.  Limiting prophylactic legislation only 
to those who have experienced actual slavery or involuntary servitude 
overlooks the deterrent aspect of the power.  If, for example, a state 
were to pass a “White Code” that limited the legal capacity of white 
citizens to convey property and enforce contracts, one would think 
that Congress would be able to respond under Section 2 even though 
white people have never been enslaved as a class.261  A public law such 
as a “White Code,” because it denies to an entire racial class certain 
core civil rights, might well be deemed to portend future restrictions 
akin to slavery.262  Accordingly, Approach Three is at best an incom-
plete expression of the class protected by Section 2. 
Approach Four would permit Congress to use its power to protect 
people of any class who experience any conduct that otherwise would 
qualify as a badge or incident of slavery.  The focus of this approach is 
on the nature of the conduct rather than the identity of the victim.  
First proposed by Professor Buchanan and since utilized by other 
scholars, this approach gives Congress the most expansive power of 
all the approaches discussed here.  Congress, for example, could at-
tempt to pass a federal law sanctioning gay marriage, arguing that be-
cause restrictions on marriage and contract rights were incidents of 
slavery, state restrictions on gay marriage impose those same inci-
dents on a modern minority population.263  Similarly, one could argue 
that because sexual violence against slave women was a badge and in-
 
261 This same critique could be leveled at Approach One as well. 
262 The logical retort would be to ask why, under my overall approach, Congress could pro-
tect white people but not women, gays, or other nonracial minorities who might be sub-
ject to a similar code denying fundamental civil rights.  My response, simply, is that struc-
tural principles and the historical record must impose some limits on the scope of the 
Section 2 power.  The concept of the badges and incidents of slavery is historically rooted 
in slavery, which, in our history, is tied inextricably with the concept of race.  While the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s more general language has been construed to provide protec-
tions for other powerless groups, the Thirteenth Amendment can only be read so far.  
Given the domination of white owners in the slave system, it is enough of a stretch to say 
that Congress can protect all races under Section 2.  Extending the prophylactic legisla-
tive power farther would be ahistorical and turn Congress’s power into a general civil 
rights power.  See infra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.  It is also worth pointing out 
that Congress would always be able to protect members of any group who are subjected to 
actual slavery or involuntary servitude. 
263 See, e.g., TSESIS, supra note 34, at 63; Courtman, supra note 26, at 328 (comparing homo-
sexuals to freed slaves). 
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cident of slavery, Congress has the power to provide federal criminal 
remedies for sexual violence against women generally.264 
Putting aside the question whether these are desirable out-
comes,265 it is clear that Approach Four would have profound effects 
with respect to the scope of Congress’s power under Section 2.  From 
a federalism point of view, it has the potential to transform Section 2 
into a general police power (or at least a general civil rights power) 
that would give Congress jurisdiction over issues generally thought to 
be the proper subject of state regulation.266  Indeed, read in this way, 
Section 2 would overlap in large part with—and even supplant—the 
Commerce Clause as the justification for some of the most far-
reaching federal legislation.267  Moreover, it would allow Congress to 
grant substantial civil rights protections to groups that the Supreme 
Court has not yet deemed to be suspect or quasi-suspect classes de-
serving of heightened federal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.268  It is hard to find substantial support for Approach 
Four.   
In addition to the structural concerns outlined above, the histori-
cal record clearly indicates that the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth 
Congresses did not think the Section 2 power extended so far, at least 
insofar as it justified civil rights legislation concerning the badges and 
incidents of slavery.  Rather, the clear expectation was that this cor-
nerstone of the Reconstruction concerned itself specifically with race 
and the legacy of American slavery.269  Although many groups of 
people have been subjected to persecution and inequity throughout 
 
264 Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor:  A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. L. 
REV. 480, 486–511 (1990) (arguing that compelled motherhood is an “involuntary servi-
tude” as well as a “badg[e] of slavery” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sager, supra 
note 149, at 152–53 (defending the Violence Against Women act by drawing an analogy 
between slavery and discrimination against women). 
265 Cf. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1657 
(1993) (“No matter how tempting or righteous the desired result may be, one must al-
ways be ready to recognize when the reading has become too tenuous, the proposed doc-
trine too vague, the implications too risky.”). 
266 The original draft of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided that “there shall be no discrim-
ination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the 
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”  CONG. GLOBE, 
39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866).  However, this provision was removed because “civil 
rights” was too ambiguous and some feared that including the term could lead to a grant 
of suffrage rights.  See Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer:  Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 
1968 SUP. CT. REV. 89, 103 (tracing the history of 1866 Act). 
267 But cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000) (striking down aspects of 
Violence Against Women Act as unjustified by Commerce Clause). 
268 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (declining to treat gays as a suspect 
class). 
269 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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American history, the Thirteenth Amendment was designed only to 
deal with the most pervasive and perfidious of these, namely, racia-
lized chattel slavery.  This has clearly been the assumption of subse-
quent Congresses, which have used Section 2 legislation to deal with 
various types of discrimination and maltreatment on the basis of race 
or color.270 
Overall, keeping in mind the prophylactic purpose of giving Con-
gress power to address the badges and incidents of slavery, a combi-
nation of Approaches Two and Three provides the best articulation 
of the populations that Congress may protect.  In other words, Sec-
tion 2 licenses Congress to protect people from the badges and inci-
dents of slavery imposed on account of race or previous condition of 
servitude.  Protecting these specific populations from the badges and 
incidents of slavery best comports with the purpose of prophylactic 
legislation, as well as the historical context of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the expectations of those Congresses that ratified and 
implemented the amendment, the understanding of subsequent 
Congresses, and the structural implications of an overly expansive 
approach to defining the badges and incidents of slavery. 
B.  Whose Conduct Can Congress Govern? 
Having identified the populations that Congress can protect, the 
next question is from whom Congress can protect them.  There are 
three general categories of actors who Congress might regulate un-
der its power to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery:  gov-
ernments, private actors engaged in conduct that has widespread 
community approval or effect, and private actors engaged in purely 
private, “one-off” action.  The best evidence supports the conclusion 
that both public and private actors can impose a badge or incident of 
slavery.  However, the concept includes only private action that is so 
widespread or influential as to pose the risk that, cumulatively, that 
action will result in the de facto reimposition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude.  Thus, some, but not all, private action is subject to con-
gressional regulation under Section 2. 
There is no doubt that public laws and actions can impose a badge 
or incident of slavery.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866—widely hailed as 
paradigmatic Section 2 enforcement legislation—displaced the Black 
Codes, public laws that reimposed some of the legal incidents of the 
 
270 See, e.g., supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (describing new hate crimes law). 
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slavery regime.271  Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases majority held that the 
concept of the badges and incidents of slavery referred only to state 
action.272  Even Justice Harlan’s dissent would have treated the private 
entities in question as quasi-public actors for purposes of the Section 
2 analysis.273  Although the Solicitor General’s brief in the Civil Rights 
Cases argued that a badge of slavery could also encompass certain 
measures taken by nongovernmental actors, there was no question 
that the concept also covered governmental actions.274 
Although one might take issue with the Civil Rights Cases majority’s 
limited view of what constitutes state action, as Justice Harlan did, it is 
not immediately clear that the majority was wrong to limit the cover-
age of the Section 2 power to public actors.  At that point in time, 
there were no recorded instances (save the Solicitor General’s brief) 
of either the term “badge” or “incident”275 being used to refer to any-
thing other than discriminatory state laws.  The very definition of an 
“incident” of slavery refers to public laws that governed slaves and 
their owners.276  And after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the term “badge” of slavery was regarded in judicial circles as a 
post-emancipation synonym for “incident.”277  Thus, when the Civil 
Rights Cases Court coined the phrase “badges and incidents of slavery” 
as the touchstone for Congress’s Section 2 power, the prevailing view 
 
271 Jones held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also applied to private action, although there is 
ongoing debate about the accuracy of this finding.  See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 70–78 (1990) (detailing arguments on both 
sides and concluding that “only racially discriminatory state action was intended to be 
prohibited”); Casper, supra note 266 (criticizing the Jones Court’s reading of legislative 
history).  This question is related to, but ultimately different from, the question whether 
Section 2 gives Congress the power to regulate both state and private action.  Neither the 
Jones majority nor dissent addressed this issue in any depth.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 476–77 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing general concerns 
about the constitutional basis of the majority’s holding).  Some members of Congress in 
1866 did express doubts whether Section 2 provided a sufficient grant of power for pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act, although those doubts did not focus on the public/private ac-
tion distinction.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 504–505 (1866) (Sen. 
Johnson) (expressing concern over the potentially further reaching effects of the Act); id. 
at 1290–93 (Rep. Bingham) (asserting that Congress should have a more limited power). 
272 According to the Court, any broader coverage “would be running the slavery argument 
into the ground.”  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
273 See id. at 42 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the law may regulate, to some extent, 
the manner in which private businesses can conduct their business). 
274 See Brief for the United States, supra note 115, at 19–20 (explaining that actions by go-
vernmental as well as private actors are both capable of violating civil rights). 
275 Or, for that matter, “relic” or “vestige.”  See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 80–96 and accompanying text. 
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was that the concept of “badges and incidents” applied to public laws 
or other forms of state action that discriminated on the basis of race. 
Limiting the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery to 
public actors would have substantial consequences, but it would not 
completely emasculate the protections current Section 2 legislation 
offers.  Certainly, one immediate effect would be the disruption of 
some legislation thought to be valid under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  Sections 1981 and 1982, for example, would no longer apply 
to private discriminatory acts278 and therefore would be removed from 
the arsenal of many civil rights lawyers.279  Likewise, the portion of the 
recent Matthew Shepard and James A. Byrd Hate Crimes Act that 
proscribes private violence motivated by race would lack a constitu-
tional predicate.  However, other statutes would fill much of the 
breach.  Title VII covers racial discrimination in employment con-
tracts.280  The Fair Housing Act bars racial discrimination in property 
conveyances.281  And federal criminal law already punishes racially 
motivated crimes committed on public property.282  Moreover, the re-
cent hate crimes bill could be made constitutional fairly easily, if it 
were amended to require a link to interstate commerce, as it does for 
crimes predicated on gender and sexual orientation. 
The Section 2 power still could play an important role in dealing 
with racially discriminatory state action.  One might think that limit-
ing the Section 2 power to state action would render the Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power superfluous, as the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and legislation pursuant to Congress’s power to en-
force that amendment) already bars racially discriminatory state ac-
tion.  However, Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power may offer 
some significant advantages over the existing analytical framework 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  For example, while the Four-
teenth Amendment remedies only intentionally discriminatory state 
 
278 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Section 1981 to provide explicitly that 
“[t]he rights protected by . . . [that provision] are protected against impairment by non-
governmental discrimination as well as against impairment under color of State law,” 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(c), did not cite a constitutional basis for the amendment.  Presumably, 
Congress thought it was acting under its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. 
279 See, e,g., Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2004) (vindicating § 1981 claim 
for racial discrimination in retail shopping setting). 
280 See Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (noting overlapping but 
not identical coverage of § 1981 and Title VII). 
281 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413–17 (1968) (noting overlapping but 
not identical coverage of § 1982 and the Fair Housing Act). 
282 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006) (prohibiting racially motivated crimes on public 
property). 
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actions,283 the Supreme Court has left open the question whether dis-
parate impact claims are cognizable under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.284  Similarly, there is no reason to think that the concept of the 
badges and incidents of slavery contains an intent requirement.285  
Thus, Congress’s power to address the badges and incidents of slavery 
might permit it to address certain racial disparities that fall outside 
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Consider, for example, criminal justice enforcement disparities 
with respect to jury service286 and the imposition of the death penal-
ty.287  Each is a product of state action and each has a long history that 
is traceable to slavery and its aftermath.288  However, while these dis-
parities continue today, it is very difficult to prove discriminatory in-
tent in any individual case.289  One could argue that these widespread 
disparities impose a badge of slavery on African Americans and there-
fore that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would permit Con-
gress to take federal action to ensure more even-handed administra-
tion of justice.  Although it is not clear that this hypothetical claim 
would prevail,290 it at least suggests that the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
283 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires a showing of discriminatory intent). 
284 See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 n.17 (1982) (stating 
that it “need not decide whether the Thirteenth Amendement itself reaches" disparate 
impact claims). 
285 The causation requirement discussed in Part III.C does not require a showing of intent. 
286 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION:  A 
CONTINUING LEGACY (2010) (tracing post-Civil War legal bars on jury service to modern-
day racial disparities in the application of peremptory challenges). 
287 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2007) (noting 
that while only half of murder victims are white, 80% of cases resulting in execution in-
volved a white victim); National Statistics on the Death Penalty and Race, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976#Vic 
(last updated Nov. 18, 2011) (noting that only seventeen whites have been executed for a 
crime involving a black victim since 1976, while 254 African Americans have been ex-
ecuted over the same period when the victim was white).  
288 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 286 (charting racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion from the Civil War to present day); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:  
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990) (tracing the history of racial discrimination in jury selection); 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden:  Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 15 (2002) (discussing the history of racial disparities in death penalty). 
289 See Maxine Goodman, A Death Penalty Wake-Up Call:  Reducing the Risk of Racial Discrimina-
tion in Capital Punishment, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 29, 43–57 (2007) (discussing the diffi-
culties in proving racial discrimination in death penalty cases); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson 
in Practice:  What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 447, 465 (1996) (discussing difficulties in proving Batson claims). 
290 As discussed in the next section, those challenging these state practices would also have to 
prove that the disparities threaten the reimposition of slavery or involuntary servitude.  
See infra Part III.C.  This could be a very difficult showing to make. 
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enforcement power—even if limited to public actors—might have 
modern applications that the Fourteenth Amendment does not.291 
The Civil Rights Cases majority was certainly correct to include 
state action in its conceptualization of the “badges and incidents of 
slavery.”  The question is whether it was correct to limit its definition 
only to state action.  One can argue that at least certain private actors 
also can impose a “badge of slavery.”  Indeed, because Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment explicitly bars both public and private 
action, Section 2 legislation presumptively applies to both sets of ac-
tors as well.292  This presumption is not dispositive here because 
prophylactic “badges and incidents” legislation is only a subset of Sec-
tion 2 legislation and thus not necessarily subject to all of the same 
conditions as “pure” enforcement legislation.293  However, the law of 
slavery, in many respects, was designed to shield private acts of vi-
olence and subordination from public view.  Furthermore, the re-
sponse to emancipation, in many respects, utilized private acts of dis-
crimination and oppression to maintain the freed slaves’ inferior 
status.  Thus, it would require a certain disregard for history to sug-
gest that only public laws could impose a badge of servitude. 
As discussed earlier, the term “badge of slavery” at its most general 
level refers to physical and metaphorical indicators of slave or subor-
dinate status.294  Before the Civil War, the term referred primarily to 
African Americans’ skin color.295  In the years immediately following 
the war, it referred primarily to discriminatory public laws.296  While 
the Civil Rights Cases majority tacitly viewed that evolution in meaning 
as complete, Solicitor General Phillips’ brief in the Civil Rights Cases 
implicitly suggested that the term could also refer to other means by 
which the freed slaves were effectively subordinated and denied the 
 
291 Of course, there are types of intentional state discrimination, like Jim Crow laws and le-
gally segregated schools, that Congress arguably could have addressed through its Section 
2 power.  See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson Cty Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, 867–68 (5th Cir. 
1966) (asserting that segregated schools placed a badge of slavery upon African-American 
children).  Cf. Debra P. v. Turlington, 654 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (calling “black functional illiteracy” a “badge of slavery”).  Howev-
er, after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
this point is moot. 
292 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1377, 1386 (2008) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment has been 
and should be interpreted to apply to both state and private action.). 
293 See supra note 235 (discussing the difference between prophylactic legislation on the 
badges and incidents of slavery and “pure” enforcement legislation). 
294 See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 76–96 and accompanying text. 
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right to participate in civil society, including discrimination in and 
exclusion from certain private transactions.297  Although the Civil 
Rights Cases’ holding effectively stunted the legal development of the 
term “badge,”298 the development of the terms “relic” and “vestige” of 
slavery illustrates how “badge” might have evolved, at least in terms of 
the actors capable of engaging in conduct cognizable under Section 
2.299  After the turn of the century, both terms shifted from references 
to public laws to private conduct, including racial violence and dis-
crimination.300  While “relic” and “vestige” were not used specifically 
as legal terms of art in the Thirteenth Amendment context and are 
not dispositive of the meaning of “badge,” the definitional evolution 
experienced by each term at least signals that, in the post-war years, 
private conduct became an increasingly important means of subjugat-
ing African-Americans—supplementing and perhaps even supplant-
ing state law. 
It was not until 1968 that the Jones Court reversed the Civil Rights 
Cases and resolved that a private actor could impose a “badge of sla-
very.”301  Although many have questioned Jones’ statutory holding that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to cover all private action,302 
those critics did not assert that Congress lacked the power to regulate 
private action under Section 2.303  Regardless, Congress has amended 
the statute to clarify that in fact it does cover “nongovernmental dis-
crimination,”304 and there has been no suggestion since that Congress 
lacked the power under Section 2 to regulate at least some private ac-
tors.305  However, there has also been virtually no discussion as to the 
 
297 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
298 “Badge of slavery” was invoked occasionally by civil rights lawyers after the Civil Rights Cas-
es, but it continued to refer to public forms of discrimination, like Jim Crow laws.  See su-
pra notes 136–37. 
299 As I discuss below, the evolving meaning of “relics” and “vestiges” is affirmatively unhelp-
ful when it comes to understanding the causation aspect of the “badges and incidents of 
slavery.”  See infra Part III.C. 
300 See supra notes 161–72 and accompanying text. 
301 Because the facts of Jones were concerned with commercial real estate discrimination by a 
property developer, the Court did not have occasion to distinguish between widespread 
and isolated private conduct.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412–16 
(1968). 
302 See, e.g., Casper, supra note 266. 
303 See Casper, supra note 266 (criticizing logic and historical analysis of Jones).  Justice Harlan 
noted that the constitutional basis of the Court’s ruling was questionable, but he did not 
elaborate on his concerns.  See Jones, 392 U.S. at 476–77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
304 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (providing that “[t]he rights 
protected by . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1981] are protected against impairment by nongovernmen-
tal discrimination and impairment under color of State law”). 
305 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981:  Clio Still Bemused and 
Confused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 344–51 (questioning whether the “full and equal bene-
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limits of this proposition:  Are there certain types of private action 
that Section 2 does not empower Congress to address? 
There are several approaches one could take in distinguishing 
among types of private actors.306  First, one could focus (as Justice 
Harlan did in his Civil Rights Cases dissent), on whether the private 
entity was performing a public function as defined by Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine.307  Of course, public function doctrine today is 
more limited than it was at the time of the Civil Rights Cases,308 so this 
category of actors is likely to be relatively small.309  Moreover, since 
the purpose of public function doctrine is to identify “state actors,” it 
is not clear that this approach would include any truly private actors 
in the pool of actors subject to Thirteenth Amendment regulation. 
Second, one could focus on numbers and say that Congress can 
regulate private actors who participate in widespread, common forms 
of discrimination.  For example, private property developers who 
promoted residential segregation, such as the Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
(the defendant in Jones), controlled so much property and engaged 
in such common practices that they could be subject to congressional 
regulation under this theory.310  This idea is analogous to the Four-
teenth Amendment concept of custom, in which the unwritten but 
“persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials” 
obtain the force of law.311  Indeed, it harkens back to the role of cus-
tom in the nineteenth century, in which “pervasive private practices” 
 
fit” clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to private actors but conceding that 
the bar on discrimination in making and enforcing contracts applies to private actors). 
306 The easy answer would be to decline to draw such a distinction and instead say that all 
private actors are capable of imposing a badge of slavery.  However, the development and 
usage of the term “badge of slavery” and related concepts belies such a broad view, as his-
torically there was a clear focus on public actors.  Thus, in adding private actors to the 
mix, one must be careful not to overstep. 
307 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–297 
(2001) (examining the factors historically assessed by the Court when determining 
whether or not challenged activity is State action). 
308 See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine:  The Search for Go-
vernmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 346 n.83 (1997) (“In no subsequent Su-
preme Court decision has the Court been willing to apply the public function analysis as 
liberally as advocated by Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases.”). 
309 For example, in his Runyon v. McCrary dissent, Justice White argued that the concept of a 
badge of slavery does not extend to intimate private transactions like “[a] racially moti-
vated refusal to hire a Negro or a white babysitter or to admit a Negro or a white to a pri-
vate association.” 427 U.S. 160, 211 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
310 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 119 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (noting that the 
area denied to the Jones family was designed to accommodate one thousand people); 
Karl Taeuber, Negro Residential Segregation:  Trends and Measurement, 12 SOC. PROBS. 42 
(1964) (measuring racial segregation in cities). 
311 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970). 
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were an accepted source of law.312  In light of the analogy to the law of 
custom, identifying private parties who engage in widespread acts of 
discrimination would seem to be an easily administrable test.  Howev-
er, this approach seems potentially underinclusive, as it would ex-
clude the “instigator,” i.e., the private party whose act of discrimina-
tion or violence is so influential that it ultimately replicates itself. 
Thus, a third way to approach this issue might focus on the social 
status of the actor and likely effect of his or her action.  This was the 
approach endorsed by Solicitor General Phillips in his Civil Rights 
Cases brief.313  The key inquiry is whether the private actor has such 
influence or capacity to shape public opinion that her actions are 
likely to generate (or already reflect) a trend of wider subjugation of 
the targeted class.  Although it differs from the previous approaches, 
it retains appealing elements from each:  In reality, private actors who 
qualify often will be community leaders, those performing public 
functions, or those whose conduct is already part of a wider custom.  
This approach—with its joint focus on the status of the actor and the 
effect of her action—recognizes that some private actors do have the 
capacity to impose a badge of slavery.  However, it identifies those ac-
tors in a sufficiently limited way to alleviate concerns that Congress 
could use its Section 2 power to regulate every private party who en-
gages in a discriminatory act.  It also dovetails with the causal element 
I propose in the following section, which helps focus on what types of 
conduct Congress can regulate. 
C. What Conduct Can Congress Target? 
After Congress identifies a state actor or influential private actor 
who engages in conduct that targets a group because of race or pre-
vious condition of servitude, the final question is whether the con-
duct in question amounts to a “badge and incident of slavery.”  It is 
tempting to attach that label to many modern manifestations of racial 
injustice, and it is undoubtedly true that much of today’s racial in-
 
312 George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law:  An Essay on the 
Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV. 925, 931 (2003); see also id. at 940 (noting that 
after the Thirteenth Amendment, “the persistent effects of customs relegating African-
Americans to the status of property continued to influence the content and enforcement 
of state law”). 
313 See Brief for the United States, supra note 115, at 19, 23–24 (arguing that regulation of 
quasi-public actors under Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments is constitutional). 
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equality is traceable in some way to slavery and its aftermath.314  How-
ever, for the concept of “badges and incidents of slavery” to adequate-
ly guide congressional enforcement efforts under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, there must be a set of limiting principles that point to a 
discernable range of meaning for the concept.  This section proposes 
that for conduct to constitute a badge and incident of slavery, it must 
satisfy two criteria:  First, the conduct must mirror a historical inci-
dent of slavery.  Second, the conduct must pose a risk of causing the 
renewed legal subjugation of the targeted class. 
The historical element provides an important link between the in-
stitution of slavery and modern conduct.315  The restriction of slaves’ 
most elemental rights and liberties was at the core of the institution 
of slavery, and therefore it makes sense to look for conduct that in-
fringes on those same rights or liberties.  Indeed, a “badge” of slavery 
historically has been understood as an analogue to the actual legal 
incidents of slavery.316  Because either public or private conduct can 
rise to the level of a “badge of slavery,”317 exact duplication of the law 
of slavery is not required.  Rather, regulated conduct must echo the 
slave codes by seeking to restrict some of the same rights and free-
doms that were also restricted by official means under slavery. 
Examples that satisfy this historical link abound.  Jim Crow laws 
requiring racially segregated facilities in most areas of public life cer-
tainly echoed laws preventing slaves from traveling outside their plan-
tations without the express permission of their masters.318  Anti-
miscegenation laws had direct parallels to slave-era laws that banned 
 
314 See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation, and Contemporary Racism:  
Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49 (2004) 
(discussing links between slavery and modern racial disparities). 
315 As discussed in Part III.A, racial classes are not the only ones subject to the badges and 
incidents of slavery.  Section 2 allows Congress to protect others who have been held in 
slavery or involuntary servitude.  The question then would be whether the conduct in 
question has a link to their particular experience of involuntary servitude.  However, giv-
en the prominence of race-based chattel slavery in our history, I will spend the rest of this 
discussion focusing on how to identify the “badges and incidents” of that particular type 
of slavery. 
316 See supra notes 65–96 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of “badge of sla-
very”). 
317 See supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.). 
318 See MORRIS, supra note 49, at 338 (discussing “pass laws”); see also Brief for the United 
States, supra note 115, at 15, 21 (claiming that the refusal of private businesses to serve 
African Americans effected a “[r]estraint upon the right of locomotion [which] was a 
well-known feature of the slavery abolished by the thirteenth amendment . . . [an] inci-
dent . . . of the very essence of the institution”). 
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slaves from marrying altogether.319  Privately enforced racially restric-
tive covenants that barred African Americans from living in certain 
neighborhoods mirrored slave-era laws that barred slaves from enter-
ing contracts and owning real and personal property.320  And racially 
motivated hate crimes, as the Second Circuit has found, “have a long 
and intimate historical association with slavery and its cognate institu-
tions.”321  Race-based private violence against slaves was decrimina-
lized and continued in “staggering proportions in the immediate af-
termath of the [Civil War]”322 to dissuade “the exercise, by black 
Americans, of the rights and habits of free persons.”323 
I agree that a historical link between modern conduct and slavery 
is a necessary component of the Section 2 calculus.324  While neces-
sary, though, the historical element is not sufficient because it does 
not adequately delimit the Section 2 power.  If a historical tie to sla-
very, however attenuated, were the sole determinant of Congress’s 
power, that power would be broad indeed—a power to “define the 
infringement of . . . [any] righ[t] as a form of domination or subor-
dination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringe-
ment as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”325  The other li-
miting principles I propose in this Article (i.e., that Congress may 
protect only racial groups and others formerly enslaved,326 and may 
regulate only state and widespread private action)327 might well nar-
row the range of conduct that Congress can address under Section 2.  
 
319 Compare Act of Feb. 9, 1881, ch. 3283, 1881 Fla. Laws 86 (making the maximum punish-
ment for miscegenation a fine of $1000), invalidated by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 
(1967), with Act of Feb. 14, 1866, ch. 556, 1866 Ky. Acts 37 (making the minimum pu-
nishment for miscegenation five years in prison), invalidated by Loving, 388 U.S. at 2, and 
Estill v. Rogers, 64 Ky. 62 (1866) (affirming that slaves lacked the capacity to marry prior 
to emancipation), and STROUD, supra note 47, at 41 (describing a Louisiana law barring 
slave marriage). 
320 Compare STROUD, supra note 47, at 29–33 (describing various gathering laws that prohi-
bited slaves from having legal property rights), with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5 
(1948) (describing a racially restrictive covenant signed by property owners). 
321 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 189 (2d Cir. 2002). 
322 Id. at 190 (quoting ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863–1877, at 119 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
323 Id. 
324 See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1577 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) 
(Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress can take 
remedial action if a present discriminatory effect on African Americans is connected to a 
discriminatory practice under the institution of slavery); Carter, supra note 34, at 1365–66 
(explaining that badges or incidents of slavery must be connected to the effects of chattel 
slavery on African Americans in the modern era). 
325 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 927 (3d ed. 2000). 
326 See supra Part III.A. 
327 See supra Part III.B. 
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However, the structural principles of federalism and separation of 
powers demand an additional limitation—beyond history—on the 
conduct that Congress can address under Section 2.  The rationale 
behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 illuminates the 
need for and function of this additional limitation. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 demonstrates that the Thirteenth 
Amendment generation understood Section 2 to permit federal pro-
tection of core civil rights, not only because state laws infringing on 
those rights hearkened back to slavery, but also because the protec-
tion of those rights was an important means to the end of ensuring 
freedom and preventing the reimposition of slavery by a different 
name.328  This prophylactic understanding of Congress’s enforcement 
power, i.e., one that permits federal regulation of otherwise constitu-
tional conduct in order to prevent constitutional violations,329 serves 
important structural values.  From a federalism perspective, it ac-
knowledges a strong national power to protect federal rights without 
permitting it to devolve into an undifferentiated police power.  From 
a separation-of-powers perspective, it safeguards the Supreme Court’s 
role as the final arbiter of the meaning of Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment while respecting Congress’s superior fact-finding capaci-
ty regarding the effects of certain discriminatory conduct. 
To advance these structural values and respect the prophylactic 
nature of the Section 2 power, I propose adding a causal element to 
the enforcement analysis.  In particular, to fall within the ambit of 
Congress’s Section 2 power, I suggest that the conduct in question 
not only must have a historical link to slavery, but also must have se-
rious potential to lead to future violations of Section 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.  In other words, even if one can draw a link be-
tween modern conduct and an incident of slavery, that conduct is 
only a “badge and incident of slavery” for Thirteenth Amendment 
purposes if it is sufficiently virulent or prevalent as to threaten the 
reemergence of slavery or involuntary servitude.330 
 
328 See McAward, supra note 15, at 143 & n.385 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 
1118 (1866)) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was justified in part because the 
rights conveyed would prevent reenslavement). 
329 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1997) (explaining the nature of Con-
gress’s prophylactic enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
330 An alternative to regarding causation as a definitional element of the badges and inci-
dents of slavery is to conceive of it as an independent limit on Congress’s enforcement 
power—a way of measuring and ensuring a “fit” between the ends set out in Section 1 and 
the means chosen by Congress.  See Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  Viewed either way, the fundamental 
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Virtually every commentator since Jones has assumed that the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” can refer to contemporary issues of 
injustice.  Thus, many have engaged in efforts to “compare contem-
porary harms to past practices”331 in an effort to identify the “linger-
ing effects of slavery.”332  However, this inquiry lacks a causal element.  
Focusing on the effects of historical slavery is distinctly different from 
focusing on the causes of slavery’s potential renewal.  The former ap-
proach equates the concept of “badges and incidents” with that of the 
“relics” and “vestiges” of slavery.333  However, the very point of the his-
tory and causation requirements articulated here is to keep those 
concepts distinct, and to ensure that Congress passes Section 2 legis-
lation that is truly prophylactic. 
The brief filed by Solicitor General Phillips in the Civil Rights Cases 
first suggested this causal element.  Specifically, he argued that Sec-
tion 2 permits Congress “to forbid any action . . . which in the light of 
our history may reasonably be apprehended to tend . . . to create an 
institution . . . viz, custom &c.” of involuntary servitude.334  Even 
though this idea was not adopted by either the majority or dissenting 
opinions,335 it provides a sensible and theoretically sound framework 
for analyzing Thirteenth Amendment legislation.  It certainly would 
have been reasonable for Congress in 1866 to view the Black Codes as 
having both the purpose and effect of keeping the freed slaves in a 
state of powerlessness and virtual dependence on their former mas-
ters.  Similarly, one can comprehend how, in 1875, Congress could 
have seen widespread public accommodations discrimination in the 
South as posing a real risk of the de facto resurrection of slavery.  The 
immediacy of the experience of slavery, combined with the virulence 
of the response to emancipation, certainly suggested that the freed 
slaves were at substantial risk of having their contractual rights, as 
well as other fundamental liberties, abridged to the point that threat-
ened their ability to participate in the basic transactions of civil socie-
ty.  And even in the early part of the twentieth century, Congress 
 
question would be the same:  whether the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate threat-
ens the reinvigoration of a state of slavery or involuntary servitude. 
331 TSESIS, supra note 34, at 118. 
332 Carter, supra note 34, at 1319. 
333 See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (contrasting the meaning of “badge” of 
slavery with the meaning of “relic” and “vestige” of slavery). 
334 Brief for the United States, supra note 115, at 16. 
335 This idea also has been overlooked in the more recent debates about the Section 2 pow-
er.  It is one purpose of this Article to draw new attention to Phillips’ suggestion and eva-
luate its propriety and relevance in the current debates about the scope of the Section 2 
power. 
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might reasonably have determined that Jim Crow laws and other 
widespread efforts to enforce racial segregation tended to threaten 
the reemergence of slavery or at least perpetuate the legal subjuga-
tion of African Americans.  Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment could 
have provided a constitutional basis outside of the Commerce Clause 
for Congress to address the widespread, officially endorsed racial dis-
crimination that characterized this nation from the post-Civil War pe-
riod through the 1960s.  Accordingly, under the framework articu-
lated in this Article, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1875, and even 
perhaps 1964 could satisfy the historical and causal elements of the 
Section 2 analysis.336 
While the above may demonstrate that Congress underutilized its 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in the Reconstruction 
and Jim Crow eras, the more pressing question is what, if any, mod-
ern applications the Section 2 power might have.  The causation in-
quiry advocated here is a strict one.  At this point in our nation’s his-
tory, it is mercifully difficult to envision any racist act—alone or in 
combination—that abridges such fundamental liberties that one 
could reasonably fear the return of an entire race (or even a single 
individual of that race) to slavery or legally subordinate status.  Con-
sider, for example, the most recent piece of Section 2 legislation.  Do 
hate crimes pose a substantial risk that a particular racial class will be 
returned to slavery or involuntary servitude?337  While Congress hypo-
thetically could amass evidence to support such a finding, it has not 
done so to date.338  Congress’s findings in the bill indicate that racial 
hate crimes are widespread and virulent and mirror some of the inci-
dents of slavery in their effect on victims’ rights.339  However, despite 
 
336 As this paragraph implies, Congress is best situated to assess the potential risks and effects 
of discriminatory behavior.  Ideally, therefore, Congress would build a record and make 
findings on this point that the Court could then review.  Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (encouraging congressional findings that would enable the Court 
“to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected in-
terstate commerce”).  Cf. also McAward, supra note 330 (discussing the deference to 
which courts should accord such findings in the Thirteenth Amendment context). 
337 Although the hate crimes bill applies to crimes based on the actual or perceived race, 
color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability 
of the victim, the only one of these characteristics relevant for Thirteenth Amendment 
purposes is race.  See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress 
invoked its enforcement power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in passing 
the race aspect of the hate crimes bill). 
338 To be fair, Congress had no reason to make a record on this point.  Its basic findings of 
fact would certainly satisfy the Court under the deferential standard set out in Jones. 
339 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702, 
123 Stat. 2190, 2835–36 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249) (finding that hate crimes are 
“serious, widespread, and interstate in nature” and “frequently savage[] the community 
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Congress’s assertion that “eliminating racially motivated violence is 
an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the 
badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude,”340 
there is no specific finding linking racial hate crimes to a threatened 
reemergence of slavery or involuntary servitude.341 
Perhaps this means that the concept of the “badges and incidents 
of slavery” refers to a nearly empty set.  One could argue that this is 
the unavoidable consequence of remaining true to Supreme Court 
doctrine that Section 1 protects only against slavery and coerced la-
bor342 and to the prophylactic purpose of Section 2 legislation.  More-
over, it is a testament to the effectiveness (and limited nature) of the 
Amendment:  although courts have jurisdiction under Section 1 to 
deal with modern manifestations of slavery and involuntary servitude, 
Section 2’s grant of prophylactic enforcement power to Congress is 
virtually obsolete. 
For those who have called the Thirteenth Amendment enforce-
ment power a modern “means for enforcing . . . [the nation’s] foun-
dational principles of liberty and general wellbeing”343 this result 
would be highly upsetting.  One possible way to retain the modern 
applicability of Section 2 might be to change the relevant timeframe 
of the causation inquiry.  Professor Carter has taken this approach, 
identifying a badge and incident of slavery by asking whether the 
challenged conduct was “part of de jure and de facto attempts to re-
turn the freedmen to a condition of servitude and sub-humanity after 
formal emancipation.”344  In other words, even if particular conduct 
does not pose a risk of slavery today, it is a badge and incident of sla-
 
sharing the traits that caused the victim to be selected,” impede “[t]he movement of 
members of targeted groups,” and prevent members of targeted groups “from purchasing 
goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating in other com-
mercial activity”). 
340 Id. at 2836. 
341 There are a few statements by witnesses and members of Congress that allude to restric-
tions of civil rights that flow from hate crimes.  See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H4945 (daily ed. 
Apr. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“[Hate crimes are] intended to say to mem-
bers of a group, don’t be who you are.  Don’t go where you’re not wanted.  Do not exer-
cise your civil rights to be yourself, to speak publicly, to go wherever you want.”)  These 
statements, however, do not directly address the Thirteenth Amendment question. 
342 See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (holding that psychological coercion 
is not enough to violate the rights guaranteed by Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
because that section should be narrowly construed to prohibit slavery and forced labor 
involving the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion), superseded by statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1589 (2006). 
343 Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom:  Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 307, 309 (2004). 
344 Carter, supra note 34, at 1367. 
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very if, during the post-war and Reconstruction eras, it was part of the 
effort to reestablish a de facto slave system in the South. 
This approach, however, conflates the historical requirement with 
the causation requirement.  The relevant inquiry is whether, at the 
time Congress passes a law, it is constitutionally empowered to do 
so.345  Because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 addressed state laws that 
sought to reimpose the incidents of slavery by restricting freed slaves’ 
fundamental civil liberties, it was valid as passed.  With respect to the 
new hate crimes bill, however, there are two relevant questions:  
whether racial hate crimes carry the potential to reenslave African 
Americans today and whether historically they were an aspect of the 
slave system.  Congress is only entitled to pass hate crimes legislation 
today if both prongs of this inquiry are satisfied. 
Another possible response to the concern that a heightened cau-
sation requirement would render the Section 2 power nugatory 
might be to relax that requirement by drawing metaphors from the 
concept of slavery.  For example, instead of asking whether the con-
duct in question would “tend . . . to create an institution [of slavery or 
involuntary servitude],”346 we could ask whether it has the potential to 
perpetuate the “relics” or “vestiges” of slavery or would tend to fo-
ment societal racial disparities.  Such inquiries presumably would be 
much easier to satisfy—too easy to satisfy, in fact.  Slavery and invo-
luntary servitude are the touchstones of the Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, not racial injustice writ large.  In keeping with 
the prophylactic purpose of Section 2, Congress may not remove its 
focus too far from the reality of slavery when it attempts to classify 
conduct as a badge and incident of slavery. 
Another possible metaphor that presents a closer call is to ask 
whether the conduct in question has the potential to return African 
Americans to “second-class citizenship.”347  Several have used this 
 
345 See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (explaining that a 
court evaluating a statute must consider the legislative facts at the time the statute was 
enacted). 
346 Brief for the United States, supra note 115, at 16. 
347 Or to “civil slavery,” defined by Virginia lawyer and abolitionist St. George Tucker as a 
state that 
exists whenever there is an inequality of rights, or privileges, between the subjects 
or citizens of the same state . . . ; for the pre-eminence of one class of men must be 
founded and erected upon the depression of another; and the measure of exalta-
tion in the former, is that of the slavery of the latter. 
  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY 16–17 (Negro Univs. Press 1970) 
(1796). 
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formulation in the Thirteenth Amendment context,348 and I have al-
ready shown some flexibility in this direction, stating that the causa-
tion inquiry should target conduct that portends slavery, “threaten[s] 
[one race’s] ability to participate in the basic transactions of civil so-
ciety,”349 or returns a racial class to “legally subordinate status.”350  In 
my view, each of these formulations comes much closer to capturing 
the essence of slavery and its aftermath, namely, the complete disen-
franchisement of an entire race.351  “Second-class citizenship”—
understood in this vein—is another potential way to describe this 
state of powerlessness. 
“Second-class citizenship,” however, is also sufficiently ambiguous 
that it could be interpreted to refer to racial disparities that do not, in 
fact, portend the actual legal subjugation of African Americans.  
Thus, allowing any metaphors to enter the “badges and incidents” in-
quiry poses the risk that Congress could use them as a backdoor way 
to expand the scope of Section 2 enforcement legislation.  The key, it 
seems, is resisting the urge to take the “second-class citizenship” me-
taphor too far and insisting on a rigorous causation analysis.  To de-
termine whether a particular racial disparity or injustice is a badge or 
incident of slavery, Congress must assess the likelihood that, left un-
addressed, the conduct in question would have the cumulative effect 
of subordinating an entire race to the point that it would render it 
unable to participate in and enjoy the benefits of civil society.352  The 
prophylactic nature of the Section 2 power demands no less. 
 
348 Judge John Minor Wisdom assumed the “second-class citizenship” metaphor applied in 
the Thirteenth Amendment context, stating that “the Wartime Amendments created an 
affirmative duty that the States eradicate all relics, ‘badges and indicia of slavery’ lest Ne-
groes as a race sink back into ‘second-class’ citizenship.”  United States v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 873 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis omitted). 
349 See supra pp. 606, 626. 
350 See supra p. 627. 
351 Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases majority acknowledged that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
“vindicate[d] those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and 
the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction between free-
dom and slavery.” 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).  Because the majority endorsed the 1866 Act as a 
valid use of the Section 2 power, this statement suggests the Court will uphold legislation 
that seeks to protect a certain subset of legal rights. 
352 The precise metric by which Congress is to measure this risk, and the standard of review 
under which the Court is to review its findings, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, it has been widely accepted 
that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
power to enforce that amendment by legislating regarding the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”  There is, however, no similarly ac-
cepted understanding of what a badge and incident of slavery is.  In-
deed, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co. empowered Congress to define the 
concept for itself, subject to only the most minimal rational basis re-
view. 
The premise of this Article is that there must be—and, indeed, 
is—a more precise way to conceptualize and identify the badges and 
incidents of slavery.  Drawing from the historical usage of the terms 
“badges of slavery” and “incidents of slavery” and from the structural 
principles that must govern any exercise of the Section 2 power, this 
piece considers the “badge and incident” concept from the perspec-
tive of victims, perpetrators, and hallmarks of conduct.  Ultimately, 
this Article proposes that a badge and incident of slavery for Thir-
teenth Amendment purposes is public or widespread private action, 
based on race or previous condition of servitude, that mimics the law 
of slavery and has significant potential to lead to the de facto re-
enslavement or legal subjugation of the targeted group. 
